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Politics by Other Means: The
Battle over the Classification of
Asymmetrical Conflicts
Yahli Shereshevsky*

ABSTRACT

Transnationalarmed conflicts between states and non-state
armed groups have emerged as a defining characteristic of
twenty-first century warfare. Humanitarian actors tend to
classify such conflicts (e.g., between the United States and ISIL)
as non-international armed conflicts rather than international
armed conflict. This classification is subject to considerable
debate;yet both sides present their views as the inevitable result
of the interpretationof the relevant InternationalHumanitarian
Law (IHL) treaty articles.
This Article demonstrates that the classification of
transnational armed conflicts as non-international armed
conflicts does not merely concern the applicationof the relevant
laws, but represents a fundamental shift in the attitude of
humanitarian actors: while IHL has traditionally been
considered the most effective legal constraint on the brutality of
warfare, the current trend perceives International Human
Rights Law as the desirable legal regime for regulating
asymmetrical conflicts. Humanitarian actors prefer to classify
these conflicts as non-internationalarmed conflicts because the
relative lack of IHL norms applicable to that class of conflict
more protective
enables extensive application of the
international human rights law as a complementary
mechanism. Nonetheless, the adoption of this classification by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld may have been
a Pyrrhic victory for this novel approach due to the United
States' reluctance to apply international human rights law
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norms to extraterritorialconflicts. Thus, instead of the full
applicationof IHL norms, only the vague norms relevant to noninternational armed conflicts apply, without the benefit of
applying internationalhuman rights law as a complementary
legal regime.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Much has been written about the politics of international
humanitarian law (IHL). 1 IHL constitutes a fertile ground for
ideological confrontation with disagreement even stemming from the
name assigned to this legal regime. 2 The inherent tension in the
delicate balance between humanitarian considerations and military
necessity that underlies IHL makes the conflict between competing
ideological positions almost unavoidable. This Article focuses on one
particular normative tension: the way in which the classification of
transnational armed conflicts between states and extraterritorial
non-state armed groups (transnational armed conflicts), 3 as either
international armed conflicts (IACs) or non-international armed
conflicts (NIACs), has been used as a strategic tool in the general
ideological struggle over the regulation of warfare. These conflicts,
such as the conflicts between the United States and ISIL, 4 between
the United States and al Qaeda, or between several African states
and Boko Haram, have drawn much attention in recent years.
Surprisingly, although the question of the classification of
transnational armed conflicts is one of the major debates in
contemporary IHL discourse, it has largely been left outside of the
discussion on the politics of IHL, even by authors who discuss these
5
politics openly in other contexts.

1.
See, e.g., DAVID KENNEDY, OF WAR AND LAW (2006); Nathaniel Berman,
Privileging Combat? Contemporary Conflict and the Legal Construction of War, 43
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (2004); Chris af Jochnick & Roger Normand, The
Legitimation of Violence: A CriticalHistory of the Laws of War, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 49
(1994); David Luban, Military Necessity and the Cultures of Military Law, 26 LEIDEN J.
INT'L L. 315 (2013); Marko Milanovic, The Lost Origins of Lex Specialis: Rethinking the
Relationship Between Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, in
THEORETICAL BOUNDARIES OF ARMED CONFLICT AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Jens d. Ohlin ed.,
forthcoming) [hereinafter Milanovic, The Lost Origins]; Yuval Shani, Human Rights
and Humanitarian Law as Competing Legal Paradigms for Fighting Terror, in
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 13
(Orna Ben-Naftali ed., 2010).
2.
IHL is usually associated with humanitarian or progressive voices, while
the laws of war or the laws of armed conflict (LOAC) are associated with more
conservative voices. See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti, Human Dignity in Combat: The Duty to
Spare Enemy Civilians, 39 ISR. L. REV. 81, 83 (2006); Luban, supra note 1, at 315.
However, the use of these terms does not always reflect ideological differences, but may
be based on other reasons, such as institutional conventions. In this Article, I usually
use the term IHL to describe the laws that regulate armed conflicts.
3.
There is no agreed term for these conflicts. In this Article I have chosen to
use the term transnational armed conflicts, which is used in some of the literature.
Others use different terms, such as cross-border NIACs or trans-border armed
conflicts.
ISIL is the acronym for the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, a non4.
state armed group also known as ISIS, IS, and DA'ISH.
5.
Milanovic is perhaps the most explicit regarding the ideological
motivations, but even he did not significantly address the politics of classification: See
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The contemporary classification debate is the outcome of a long
history of states' reluctance to support the full application of IHL
norms in internal armed conflicts. IHL is built on a pragmatic
compromise aimed at minimizing the calamities of war to the greatest
extent possible, by regulating warfare but not prohibiting it
altogether. Its core principles limit the ways in which the opposing
sides can conduct their operations, whilst at the same time allowing
them to conduct an effective military campaign. Significantly, this
compromise is based to a large extent on the notion of symmetry
between the parties to the conflict: in order to reach and follow a
compromise
between
military
needs
and
humanitarian
considerations, the parties to a conflict must be able to expect to incur
similar gains and burdens from this agreed compromise. Indeed, one
of the most important principles of the laws of war is the equality of
belligerents. This principle means that IHL norms apply equally to
all parties to a conflict regardless of the potential differences between
them. 6 It is believed that normative symmetry has an important
impact on the willingness of parties to the conflict to comply with IHL
norms.

7

Asymmetrical conflicts, in which the application of similar rules
has radically different repercussions for the parties involved,
complicate the ability to effectively regulate warfare. There are
several asymmetries that can be discussed in the context of armed
conflicts. 8 This Article focuses on situations that combine two main
asymmetries: significant differences in power between the parties to
the conflict and the asymmetry between states and non-state actors
with respect to international legal personality. Significant asymmetry
Milanovic, The Lost Origins, supra note 1, at 2 ("[B]oth camps are prepared to use all of
the tools in the lawyerly toolbox to advance their broader agenda, be it
formalismlpositivism/textualism, teleological interpretation, pragmatism, or various
moral, value and policy judgments. I think it fair to say that while some of these tools
might be used a bit more by one camp than by the other, there is really no
methodological consistency in that regard-the same person can be a textualist by day
(e.g. in rejecting the extraterritorial application of the ICCPR) and a pragmatist by
night (e.g. by using the nebulous lex specialis principle to disregard the clear text of
human rights treaties). I also think it fair to say that, as a general matter, the
positivist interpretative positions of the members of either camp align perfectly with
their individual policy preferences. I, at least, have not met anyone who thinks that de
lege lata human rights apply everywhere and all the time, including in armed conflict,
but that this is a bad thing which is unfortunately unavoidable, nor conversely anyone
who thinks that it would be just fantastic to apply human rights as broadly as possible,
but that the current legal framework simply does not at all allow it.").
6.
See, e.g., Gabriella Blum, On a Differential Law of War, 52 HARV. INT'L L.J.
164, 168-73 (2011).

7.

Adam Roberts, The Equal Application of the Laws of War: A Principle

Under Pressure, 90 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 931, 961 (2008) ("[W]hen the laws of war
have been developed or interpreted in a way that can be perceived as privileging one
side in a conflict because of the nature of its cause, the other side has often shown a
tendency to ignore or downgrade the law.").
8.
See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, Asymmetrical Warfare and International
HumanitarianLaw, 62 A.F.L. REV. 1 (2008).
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in power results in a divergence of interests between the parties to
the conflict with the stronger side having a clear interest in looser
regulation. It is easier for the stronger side to realize its military
advantage and achieve its goals with fewer limitations on its ability
to use force. Moreover, asymmetry in political status and clout
enables the stronger side to design the law in accordance with its
interests and preferences. The influence of these asymmetries can be
clearly seen in the creation of two different types of conflicts under
IHL-IACs and NIACs. The laws of IACs, which have traditionally
been regarded as applicable to conflicts between two or more states,
usually reflect IHL's pragmatic compromise. In contrast, with regard
to NIACs, which were traditionally regarded as internal armed
conflicts, states have long resisted the introduction of the same
normative regime applicable in IACs due to the power asymmetries
discussed above. As a result, the norms of NIAC have become biased
in favor of state interests.
The lesser regulation in NIAC is a cause for concern from a
humanitarian perspective due to the diminished ability to protect the
victims of armed conflict under such a regime. Humanitarian actors,
such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), have
tried to advance the full application of IHL norms in NIACs in order
to increase the protection of civilian populations in such conflicts.
When direct attempts to change the laws of NIAC by way of
legislation to better reflect the IHL ethos failed, the need arose to
take a different path. Ostensibly, this path was fairly clear: if it was
not possible to explicitly revise the treaties governing NIACs, then
interpretation could be used to narrow the gap between the law of
IAC and the law of NIAC. One way of achieving this goal was to
widen the definition of IAC to include at least some asymmetrical
conflicts previously deemed outside its scope of application. However,
this was not the only available solution to the problem. This Article
describes the classification debate relating to two situations-the
conflict in the former Yugoslavia and the transnational armed
conflicts of the twenty-first century-and argues that it reflects two
competing responses to the deficiencies of the law of NIAC. While the
conflict in Yugoslavia was widely classified as an IAC, transnational
armed conflicts have been widely classified as NIACs. Neither of
these situations fit the classical attributes of an internal armed
conflict: the conflict in the former Yugoslavia involved both states and
internal non-state armed groups with strong relationships to foreign
states, while the transnational armed conflicts of the twenty-first
century involve states on the one hand and non-state armed groups
operating inside the territory of foreign states on the other.
If this were a matter of simple interpretation, there would be no
real puzzle, and, indeed, many scholars treat the classification of
transnational armed conflicts as the inevitable result of the
interpretive exercise. However, this Article demonstrates that in both
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situations an alternative classification as a NIAC or LAC was a valid
interpretation. This Article argues that the choice between these
competing interpretive approaches reflects a battle over the role of
IHL in the regulation of asymmetrical armed conflicts. Put
differently, the interpretive alternatives reflect two opposing
approaches regarding the desirable normative regime in such
conflicts. Whereas the interpretive approach to the events in the
former Yugoslavia, which I call the "inclusive approach," envisioned
the implementation of IHL norms pertaining to IACs as a desirable
goal, the interpretive position regarding the classification of
transnational armed conflicts, which I call the "exclusive approach,"
views the more protective International Human Rights Law (IHRL),
which fills the many gaps of IHL in NIACs, as the preferable
normative regime.
The politics of IHL are often presented as a binary tension
between the laws of war or law of armed conflict (LOAC) camp and
the IHL camp, between military lawyers and humanitarian lawyers. 9
The LOAC camp emphasizes the legitimizing role of laws of war,
while the IHL camp emphasizes its limiting role; the LOAC camp
protects existing power structures and the current status quo, while
the IHL camp has progressive aspirations. 10 This Article
demonstrates that the politics of IHL might better be thought of as
revealing a tension within a triangle comprised of three camps: (i) the
state apologetics camp, who argue for as limited of a regulation of
warfare as possible; (ii) the IHL camp, who argue for the maximum
application of IHL norms; and (iii) the IHRL camp, who argue for the
maximum application of IHRL norms. Recharacterizing the politics of
IHL as a triangle emphasizes the uniqueness of the pragmatic
compromise of IHL as a middle ground between apology and utopia.
It can be seen as a more limited version of the emergence of IHL, as a
third way between realist and pacifist accounts of warfare. 1 1 It is not
only a struggle between state apologetics and humanistic forces,
between lex lata and de lege ferenda, but also between different
visions of this more humanitarian lex ferenda.
This novel vision of IHRL as the desirable legal framework
should be considered with great caution, even from a humanitarian
perspective. This Article addresses several concerns in this regard.
Specifically, it questions whether this approach can be applied in full,
taking into consideration the current positions of relevant states on
the relationship between IHL and IHRL. The Article suggests that

9.

Luban, supra note 1, at 315-16.

10.

See, e.g., id.

11.
See, e.g., GEOFFREY BEST, HUMANITY IN WARFARE: THE MODERN HISTORY
OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS 15 (1980) (describing IHL as "in
between the positions of unrestrained and absolute violence on the one hand,
unresisting and absolute non-violence on the other.").
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the classification of transnational armed conflicts as NIACs in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld1 2 may have been a Pyrrhic victory for the
"exclusive approach," due to the reluctance of the U.S.
administration, as well as the Supreme Court in several cases, to
apply IHRL to transnational armed conflicts.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part II presents the development
of IHL treaty law of asymmetrical armed conflicts. Part III discusses
the two alternative responses to the inequality of the law as it applies
to asymmetrical conflicts-the endorsement of the "inclusive
approach" with respect to the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and
the endorsement of the "exclusive approach" with respect to
transnational armed conflicts. Part IV explains how the enormous
growth in the role of IHRL in the regulation of armed conflicts is the
most reasonable explanation for the departure from the inclusive
approach and the adoption of the exclusive approach to classification.
Part V then critically examines the exclusive approach and rethinks
its desirability in a non-ideal world. Part VI concludes.

II. IHL's

PRAGMATIC COMPROMISE AND THE REGULATION OF

ASYMMETRICAL CONFLICTS: THE CASE OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED
CONFLICTS

The creation of a legal regime that follows the pragmatic
compromise
between
military necessity
and
humanitarian
considerations underlying IHL is largely dependent on the symmetry
of power between the different parties to a potential conflict. The
closer in degree and nature the gains and burdens incurred by the
13
parties, the greater the ability to reach a meaningful compromise:
in such symmetrical conflicts, the parties are expected to be able to
design norms that best limit the suffering in the conflict, since they
can equally expect to be on either the side that wishes to use force
effectively or the side that suffers the humanitarian consequences of
the use of such force. By contrast, in asymmetrical conflicts, norms
that emphasize either military necessity or humanitarian
considerations usually serve one of the parties to the conflict to a
greater degree than the other. 14
Asymmetrical conflicts are not limited to conflicts between states
and non-state actors. They also include cases where there are
significant power differences between two or more states fighting

12.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 629-36 (2006).
13.
See Robin Gei3, Asymmetric Conflict Structures, 88 INT'L REV. RED CROSS
757, 773 (2006).
14.
See, e.g., Toni Pfanner, Asymmetrical Warfare from the Perspective of
HumanitarianLaw and HumanitarianAction, 87 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 149, 160-62
(2005).

462

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 49:455

with one another. 15 In both situations, the conflicting interests of the
parties might affect norm creation and increase the gap between
positive IHL norms and IHL's initial pragmatic basis of compromise,
which emphasizes the importance of the normative symmetry
between the parties to the conflict. For instance, some of the norms
16
that were incorporated in the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions
reflect the interests of the more powerful states at the expense of less
powerful states. 1 7 However, the problems associated with
asymmetrical distribution of power are less significant when both
sides are states and have the ability to influence the law. Indeed, the
law of IAC usually follows the IHL ethos. The problem is much more
significant in cases of asymmetrical conflicts between state and nonstate actors. First, the gaps in power between the adversaries are
stable and not likely to change. States will almost always be stronger
than non-states, whereas relations of power between different states
may change. Second, the asymmetry between the parties is
manifested not only in differences in physical power, but also with
regard to the ability to design and create the relevant norms.
International law has traditionally been, and still is to a large extent,
a legal regime in which the major lawmakers are states. Under these
circumstances, it is easier for states to design the norms in a manner
that promotes their interests.
This ability is clearly manifested in the law of NIAC. Since IHL
norms were created mostly by states, they reflect a clear bias in favor
of state interests in the regulation of NIACs. In the first one hundred
years of modern IHL, states refused in most cases to apply IHL
norms to NIACs. 18 Until the creation of the four Geneva Conventions
in 1949,19 there was almost no regulation of internal armed conflicts.
As explained above, the absence of regulation helps the stronger side
to realize its military advantages. Only in cases in which a state of

15.
See Schmitt, supra note 8, at 5-6 (describing this asymmetry as
"technological asymmetry").
16.
See Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 26 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 2) 949; Convention
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annex art. 22, Oct. 18, 1907, 36
Stat. 2277, 207 Consol. T.S. 277.

17.

See Antonio Cassese, The Martens Clause: Half a Loaf or Simply Pie in the

Sky?, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 187, 198 (2000).
18.
LINDsAY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT 17-18 (2002).
19.
See Geneva Convention [I] for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75
U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter GC I]; Geneva Convention [II] for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter GC II]; Geneva Convention
[III] Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75
U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC III]; Geneva Convention [IV] Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287
[hereinafter GC IV].
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belligerency was recognized were the laws of war applied between the
parties to the conflict, and this recognition was left to the discretion of
the state party to the conflict. 20 In actuality, there have been very few
21
cases of an explicit recognition of belligerency.
Even in later periods, states remained firmly opposed to applying
the entire body of IAC norms to NIACs. During the negotiations that
led to the adoption of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the ICRC
promoted a draft text that sought to apply IHL norms in full to all
22
conflicts, whether international or non-international in character.
However, this position met strong resistance from many state
delegations to the diplomatic conference of 1949.23 Instead, a narrow
set of limitations on conduct in NIACs, namely Common Article 3 to
the Geneva Conventions (CA3), was accepted as a compromise
formula. 24 CA3 also set out the possibility of creating special
agreements between the parties to a NIAC, which can include an
obligation to follow wider norms than those enshrined in CA3 itself.
While there are some examples of actual special agreements, they
rarely include the full application of IHL treaty law and specifically
the application of combatant immunity. 2 5 The main explanations for
the limited application of special agreements are states' fear of
conferring legitimacy on the armed group and the different interests

20.
See, e.g., MOIR, supra note 18, at 10-11; LAURA PERNA, THE FORMATION OF
THE TREATY LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS 29-30 (2006); Rogier
Bartels, Timelines, Borderlines and Conflicts: The Historical Evolution of the Legal
Divide Between Internationaland Non-InternationalArmed Conflicts, 91 INT'L REV.
RED CROSS 35, 50-51 (2009). For the laws of war to apply between the parties to a
conflict, there must be recognition by the state party to the conflict; in contrast, for the
application of the laws of neutrality, there must be recognition of belligerency by thirdparty states.
21.
The most notable example in which recognition of belligerency did occur is
the American Civil War. See, e.g., PERNA, supra note 20, at 30; Bartels, supra note 20,
at 51.
22.
See, e.g., PERNA, supra note 20, at 51; JEAN PICTET, THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949: COMMENTARY 42-43 (1952) [hereinafter GC:
COMMENTARY]; Bartels, supra note 20, at 57-61.
23.
See GC: COMMENTARY, supra note 22, at 43-44.
24.
See Bartels, supra note 20, at 61-64.
25.
See, e.g., MICHELLE MACK, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INCREASING
RESPECT FOR INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED
CONFLICTS 16-18 (2008); SANDESH SIVAKUMARAN, THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL
ARMED CONFLICT 124-31 (2012) (discussing various special agreements, and
presenting parts of several of these special agreements); Ren6 Provost, Asymmetrical
Reciprocity and Compliance with the Laws of War, in MODERN WARFARE: ARMED GROUPS,
PRIVATE MILITARIES, HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LAW 17, 34 (2012) ("[T]here

have been very few recorded instances of the adoption of special agreements under
Common Article 3 relative to the prevalence of internal conflicts."); Cedric Ryngaert &
Anneleen Van de Meulebroucke, Enhancing and Enforcing Compliance with
InternationalHumanitarianLaw by Non-State Armed Groups: An Inquiry into Some
Mechanisms, 16 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 443, 454 (2011) ("In practice, there are
relatively fewer special agreements as compared with other legal instruments.").
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of the parties to the conflicts due to the power differences between
26

them.
A second attempt to apply the same level of protection granted to
traditional interstate conflicts to asymmetrical conflicts was made in
the process of adopting the additional protocols to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions in 1977.27 During this process, some delegates proposed
the adoption of a single protocol applicable to all situations of armed
conflict. 2 8 This attempt proved futile, as had the one in 1949. In the

end, a compromise was reached regarding the adoption of the second
additional protocol (APII).2 9 The protocol narrowed the scope of the
types of NIACs to which it applies, 30 in exchange for some expansion
31
of the substantive IHL norms that were introduced into it.
However, even after this expansion, the normative gap between the
treaty norms of IAC and NIAC remained significant.
In addition to APII, article 1(4) of the first additional protocol

(API) recognized a specific type of asymmetrical armed conflict,
namely wars of national liberation, as IACs. The agreement on the
text of the article was made possible partly due to the participation of
national liberation movements in the proceedings prior to the

adoption of the protocol, which mitigated, to a limited extent, the gap
between the status of states and non-state armed groups under

Provost, supra note 25, at 34-35 ("The formality of such bilateral special
26.
agreements is taken by states as ineluctably endowing the signatory insurgents with a
significant dose of the political legitimacy that states are keen to deny them."); see also
Ryngaert & Van de Meulebroucke, supra note 25, at 455 ("[A]greements are unlikely to
be concluded if there is not at least some substantive equality or balance between the
parties.").
27.
See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol 1]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of NonInternational Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609
[hereinafter Protocol Ill.
See, e.g., ANTHONY CULLEN, THE CONCEPT OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED
28.
CONFLICT IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 88-90 (2010).
See MOIR, supra note 18, at 92-94.
29.
30.
This narrower scope of application is mainly achieved by the requirement
that the armed group be in control of part of the territory of the state. See Protocol II,
supra note 27, § 1 ('This Protocol, which develops and supplements Article 3 common
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 without modifying its existing conditions
of applications, shall apply to all armed conflicts which are not covered by Article 1 of
the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) and which take
place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and
dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible
command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry
out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.").
See CULLEN, supra note 28, at 87-88.
31.
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international law. 3 2 The article had the potential to have a major
influence as the first instance of direct application of the whole body
of IHL to asymmetrical conflicts. However, it had very little practical
effect on the law of asymmetrical conflicts. 3 3 This limited effect was
mainly due to the alleged politicization of the definition of the specific
types of conflicts that it regulates: 34 Article 1(4) specifically addresses
"armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial
domination and alien occupation and against racist r6gimes in the
exercise of their right of self-determination," and since states are
reluctant to identify themselves as either an alien occupier or a racist
regime, the article has never been openly used to classify a conflict as
35
an IAC by states that are involved in an active conflict.
An area in which the distinction between international and noninternational armed conflicts has not always been maintained is the
regulation of weapons and methods of war. 36 Some of the main
conventions in this area of law do not distinguish between different
types of conflicts, applying equally to all armed conflicts. 3 7 This is
also the case of the Second Protocol to the Cultural Property
Convention. 38 In any case, these conventions do not address the core
norms regarding the means and methods of warfare or the protection
of the civilian population and therefore have only limited effect on the
regulation of warfare. Moreover, one can make the case that in the

See id. at 67. (noting that the national liberation movements participated
32.
in the proceedings, but lacked voting rights). This might seem an indication that the
asymmetry between state and non-state armed groups is not stable and might change.
Indeed, it is fair to say that the status of non-state actors is slowly strengthening.
However, as demonstrated in this section, this alleged change in status has not yet
succeeded in significantly narrowing the asymmetry in status between state and nonstate actors, and has not eliminated the inequality of the norms of asymmetrical
conflicts. This does not mean that such a change cannot happen, but it seems, even
today, still quite distant.
33.
See SIVAKUMARAN, supra note 25, at 222.
CULLEN, supra note 28, at 83 ("[The motivation behind the initiative was
34.
intrinsically political.").
See id. at 84-85. In addition, API requires a declaration under Article
35.
96(3) for the protocol to apply. The information regarding actual instances of 96(3) is
rather vague. See SIVAKUMARAN, supra note 25, at 220-21.
See THEODOR MERON, THE HUMANIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 32
36.
(2006).
37.
See, e.g., Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production
and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their
Destruction, opened for signatureApr. 10, 1972, 11 I.L.M. 309 (entered into force Mar.
26, 1975); Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for signatureJan. 13,
1993, 32 I.L.M. 800 (entered into force Apr. 29, 1997); Ottawa Convention on the
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines
and on Their Destruction, opened for signature Dec. 3, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1507 (entered
into force Mar. 1, 1999).
38.
Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, Mar. 26, 1999, 38 I.L.M. 769 (1999).
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regulation of weapons the inequality of the norms starts already with
respect to the norms of IAC, where the strong states refuse to outlaw
weapons that they believe give them an advantage over less powerful
39
states.
Thus, the treaty norms that apply to NIACs, even after the
adoption of APII, remain vague and partial. 40 Although some
progress has been made, there is still a relatively wide gap between
IAC and NIAC treaty norms. In the almost forty years since the
adoption of the additional protocols, no serious attempts have been
made to change the current legal regime through the adoption of new
core treaties. In an era where asymmetrical conflicts are becoming
more significant, 4 1 the possibility of reaching an agreement on the
desirable norms seems less likely, due to the disparate interests of
the parties and the ability of states to design the law in line with
their interests. Moreover, as long as strong states have a dominant
role in the negotiations, there is a chance that the new norms will not
bring about more equality between the parties to the conflict but may
possibly even increase current inequality.
The current treaty rules applicable to NIAC deviate in
significant aspects from core IHL principles. The greatest deviation is
found in the limited application of the principle of equality of
belligerents to NIACs. 42 Indeed, this inequality is not an explicit part
of the law of NIACs, which formally applies equally to the parties to
the conflict. 43 However, under domestic law, there is no such
equality, and thus the inevitable result of the absence of combatant
immunity from the laws of NIAC is a manifest inequality between the
parties to the conflict: while the state armed forces can conduct their

39.

Eyal Benvenisti, The Legal Battle to Define the Law on Transnational

Asymmetric Warfare, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 339, 343 (2010) [hereinafter
Benvenisti, The Legal Battle] ("Usually it is the stronger, technologically advantaged
regular army that develops and enjoys the advantage of using new weapons. That
party will most likely refuse to outlaw new weaponry it holds exclusively.").
40.

See,

e.g.,

EMILY CRAWFORD,

THE TREATMENT

OF

COMBATANTS

AND

INSURGENTS UNDER THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (2010); Frangois Bugnion, Jus ad
Bellum, Jus in Bello and Non-International Armed Conflict, 6 Y.B. INT'L
HUMANITARIAN L. 167 (2003); Marko Sassbli, Ius ad Bellum and Ius in Bello-The

Separation Between the Legality of the Use of Force and HumanitarianRules to Be
Respected in Warfare: Crucial or Outdated?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED
CONFLICT: EXPLORING THE FAULTLINES--ESsAYs IN HONOUR OF YORAM DINSTEIN 241
(Michael Schmitt & Jelena Pejic eds., 2007) [hereinafter Sass6li, lus ad Bellum].

41.
See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, The New Wars and the Crisis of Compliance
with the Law of Armed Conflict by Non-State Actors, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
711, 714-16 (2008); Benvenisti, The Legal Battle, supra note 39, at 340 ('We can
therefore anticipate that most future wars will be characterized as asymmetric,
involving powerful regular armies and irregular non-state militias.").
42.
See David Kretzmer, Rethinking the Application of IHL in NonInternational Armed Conflicts, 42 ISR. L. REV. 8, 36 (2009) [hereinafter Kretzmer,

Rethinking].
43.

Sassbli, Ius ad Bellum, supra note 40, at 256.
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operations without exposing their soldiers to significant (legal) risks
as long as they are targeting legitimate targets, IHL enables states
(under their domestic criminal laws) to prosecute fighters of non-state
armed groups for their participation in hostilities even if they only
44

target government soldiers.
This
inequality raises
serious concerns
regarding
the
effectiveness of the law of NIACs. Combatant immunity is one of the
main incentives for the parties to a conflict to comply with IHL
norms. 45 Combatant immunity is one of the key ways in which
individual soldiers in an IAC incur a direct gain from adhering to the
laws of war and are thus incentivized to attack only legitimate
targets. 4 6 In NIACs, there is no combatant immunity, and this is a
major obstacle to the effectiveness of the law of NIAC. If an armed
group's members can be tried for murder for the killing of a state's
soldiers, these members have very little incentive to refrain from
targeting civilians if they find such targeting to be a useful

strategy.

47

In light of this background, this Article demonstrates in the
following Parts that the debate over the classification of
contemporary asymmetrical armed conflicts plays an important role
in the battle over the desirable legal regime under which the
deficiencies of the law of asymmetrical conflicts can be mitigated.

44.
See Kretzmer, Rethinking, supra note 42, at 36. The possibility of a
parallel prosecution of government forces by armed groups' courts is debatable, and
some authors argue that it is not possible. See Parth S. Gejji, Can Insurgent Courts Be
Legitimate Within International Humanitarian Law?, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1525, 1542
(2013) (arguing that an armed group's court might be in accordance with international
law, but it cannot prosecute members of the armed forces for mere participation in
hostilities). Other authors argue that armed groups can prosecute governmental forces
as well. However, in practice this seems to be impractical in many cases, since this
right is subject to the ability to guarantee impartiality, independence and other core
fair trial principles, which might be unavailable to armed groups. See, e.g., Sandesh
Sivakumaran, Courts of Armed Opposition Groups: FairTrials or Summary Justice?, 7
J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 489, 508 ("All this is not to say that armed opposition groups
invariably conduct trials consistent with international standards. However, some of
them have the potential to do so. Views to the contrary are often fair but sometimes
overstated."); Jonathan Somer, Jungle Justice: Passing Sentence on the Equality of
Belligerents in Non-InternationalArmed Conflict, 89 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 655, 690
(2007) ("It is unlikely that all but the most organized armed opposition groups would be
able to meet the standards.").
45.
Geoffrey S. Corn, Thinking the Unthinkable: Has the Time Come To Offer
Combatant Immunity to Non-State Actors?, 22 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 253, 256 (2011).
46.
Eric Talbot Jensen, Combatant Status: It Is Time for Intermediate Levels of
Recognition for PartialCompliance, 46 VA. J. INT'L L. 209, 234 (2005).
47.
Id. at 232.
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III. Two ALTERNATIVE RESPONSES TO THE INEQUALITY OF THE LAW OF
NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS

The abovementioned efforts to change IHL treaty law were part
of the general movement towards the "humanization of humanitarian
law,"48 which has strengthened the humanitarian aspects of IHL over
the years. 49 The relevant actors in this humanization process are
varied and include not only humanitarian organizations such as the
ICRC, but also international tribunals and scholars who are among
what David Luban calls "humanitarian lawyers." 50 Following the
failure to explicitly amend treaty law, these actors had to take a
different approach in the quest to change the law of asymmetrical
conflicts to a more protective regime. This new approach is based
primarily on the use of interpretation to widen the protections
granted under existing treaty law applicable to asymmetrical
conflicts. What the use of interpretation seeks is not to obtain the
explicit consent of states to changing IHL norms, but rather to win
the battle of persuasion. It therefore seems to be a potentially
promising alternative to the formal change of treaty norms.
This Part focuses on the use of interpretation with regard to the
classification of asymmetrical conflicts as part of the humanization
effort. In particular, looking once again at the situation in the former
Yugoslavia and transnational armed conflicts, this Part examines
how interpretation was used in these conflicts as a tool for
substantive change in the legal regime. While the conflict in
Yugoslavia was widely classified as an IAC, transborder
asymmetrical conflicts have been widely classified as NIACs. 51 The
different positions regarding the classification of these conflicts
represent two competing approaches to the inadequacy of the law of
asymmetrical conflicts. The first approach, which I have called the
inclusive approach, is an interpretive attempt to apply the norms of
IAC to asymmetrical conflicts by either widening the definition of
IAC, or by expanding the reach of the law of IAC through the
mechanism of customary international humanitarian law to also
48.
See MERON, supra note 36.
The change of IHL towards more humanitarian norms reflects not only a
49.
solution to the inequality of IHL norms, but also changes in the perceptions of
legitimate means and methods of warfare.
50.
Luban, supra note 1, at 315-16. For a description of the relevant actors
and the way they use "soft law" and interpretation as a tool for progress that bypasses
state-centered treaty law, see Benvenisti, The Legal Battle, supra note 39, at 346
("NGOs, private legal experts, and other non-state actors have noted the willingness of
tribunals to move the law beyond formal state consent and have embarked on several
efforts to generate new law by adopting soft law 'guiding principles' and other such
informal norms that ostensibly interpret the law. These norms practically move the
law beyond state consent and below the radar screens of governments in the hope that
domestic and international courts will resort to them as reflecting evolving law.").
51.
See infra Sections III.A and III.B.
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apply to NIACs. The inclusive approach is merely the continuation of
the general quest for the humanization of humanitarian law for the
full application of IHL norms in all types of conflicts. Contrarily, the
second approach, which I have called the exclusive approach, is an
interpretive attempt to minimize the scope of application of IHL in
asymmetrical conflicts in order to replace it with the more restrictive
legal regime of IHRL. This approach deviates from the traditional
desire to apply IHL in full in all types of conflicts and places in
question the legitimacy and desirability of IHL as the main
normative regime in such situations.
This Article does not argue that the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia and the transnational armed conflicts of the twenty-first
century are similar in all aspects. Indeed, it is fair to say that the
conflict in the former Yugoslavia resembles conflicts between states
more than transnational armed conflicts do. However, this Article
does argue that these conflicts are similar in one important aspect: in
both cases, the classification of the conflict was not obvious. The
interpreters faced much discretion and could have classified the
conflicts as either an IAC or NIAC. Moreover, the interpretations
required the adoption of controversial positions. The humanitarian
actors' decision to deviate from the traditional inclusive approach and
to classify transnational armed conflicts as NIACs raises the question
that this Article seeks to answer by pointing to the role of the politics
of IHL in the classification debate.
This is not to say that the interpretive decisions were always
fully conscious and deliberate attempts to promote the politics or
ideological preferences of the relevant actors. Nonetheless, the
influence of ideological preferences on one's interpretive positions has
long been recognized and, as this Part demonstrates, can serve as an
explanation for the different positions in the allegedly formalistic
52
classification debate.

Aside from the references in note 1, which address the politics of IHL,
52.
there is much written on the effect of ideological preferences on decision making,
mainly with regard to judicial decision making, and specifically with regard to the
interpretation of norms. For an account of the politics of interpretation in international
law, see Jan Klabbers, On Rationalism in Politics: Interpretation of Treaties and the
World Trade Organization,74 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 405, 406 (2005) ("As this paper seeks
to demonstrate, interpretation is a highly political act, eventually deciding on the
precise scope of rights and obligations. With a wink and a nod to Von Clausewitz, one
might well quip that interpretation is the continuation of treaty negotiations by other
means. The meaning of a treaty is not carved in stone at the moment of its conclusion:
instead, debates continue, albeit no longer on what words to use in the treaty, but on
how to give meaning to the words that are used."). For the seminal account of the
attitudinal model, as applied to the United States Supreme Court, see JEFFREY A.
SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL
REVISITED (2002).
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A. The Inclusive Approach: From Tadi6 to the ICRC Study of
Customary InternationalHumanitarianLaw
This Part demonstrates how once the path that consisted of
changing IHL treaty law had proven largely ineffective, a different
road was taken by humanitarian actors-the inclusive approach.
Instead of trying to change treaty law directly, the inclusive approach
sought to use the interpretation of existing treaty norms as the main
tool of the humanization project. Specifically, broader interpretation
of the scope of JAC in existing treaty law and expansion of the scope
of IHL norms as applying equally in both IAC and NIAC were used as
demonstrated below, in court decisions, by various scholars, and by
humanitarian organizations to improve humanitarian protection in
asymmetrical conflicts.
The most important manifestation of the inclusive approach in
the context of classification of armed conflicts is found in the Tadid
case, the first trial before the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). 53 Under article 2 of the ICTY statute, the
tribunal has the power to prosecute persons who commit grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions. 54 These grave breaches are part
of the treaty norms that govern IACs. 55 In the Tadid case, the ICTY
Trial Chamber stated, following the Appeals Chamber decision on the
interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction, that in order to decide whether
the tribunal had jurisdiction under article 2 of the ICTY statute, the
court first had to determine whether the conflict in that case
constituted an IAC. 5 6 Specifically, it had to determine whether the
type of relationship between the non-state armed group that Tadi6
belonged to, the Bosnian Serb forces (VRS), and the Yugoslav National
Army (JNA) was sufficient for the classification of the conflict as an
IAC. 5 7 Relying on the ICJ Nicaragua case, 58 the Trial Chamber

53.
Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-T (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia May 7, 1997), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/tjug/en/tad-tsj705O7JT2e.pdf [perma.cc/H8NM-LFFD] (archived Jan. 28, 2016).
Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
54.
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in
the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, art. 2, May 3, 1993, U.N Doc.

S/25704.
55.

See GC I, supra note 19, art. 50; GC II, supra note 19, art. 51; GC III,

supra note 19, art. 130; GC IV supra note 19, art. 147; API, supra note 27, art. 11.
56.
The Appeals Court did not accept the position that these norms are part of
customary law, applicable to non-international armed conflicts. See Tadid, Case No.
IT-94-1-T,
559-60; Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the
79-84 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction,
the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadicIacdec/en/
51002.htm [perma.cc/RX37-FMB8] (archived Jan. 28, 2016).
See Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-T, 9T 584, 607.
57.
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59
decided that the relevant test should be the "effective control" test.
It then determined that despite the vital role of the JNA "in the
establishment, equipping, supplying, maintenance and staffing" of
the VRS, the "effective control" test was not satisfied. 60 As a result,
the court had no jurisdiction over allegations relying on article 2 of
the statute. 6 1 In her dissenting opinion, Presiding Judge McDonald
determined that the degree of control over the VRS was sufficient to
characterize the conflict as an IAC. 62 Judge McDonald reached this
conclusion under both the "effective control" test and the more lenient
"dependency and control" test.6 3 Judge McDonald regarded the latter
test as more suitable for cases of individual criminal responsibility
64
when compared to attribution cases such as the Nicaragua case.
Among other grounds of appeal the prosecution filed an appeal
against the ruling regarding the classification of the conflict. 65 The
Appeals Chamber granted the appeal and acknowledged the existence
of an IAC. 6 6 In reaching its conclusion, the Appeals Chamber adopted
the famous "overall control" test for determining whether non-state
armed forces are acting on behalf of a foreign state. 6 7 It emphasized
that this more flexible test is relevant to cases of armed groups, while
in cases of private individuals or groups that are not militarily
organized, the relevant test remains the Nicaragua case's "effective
68
control" test.
The Appeals Chamber did not state explicitly that it embraced
the "overall control" test as a tool to strengthen humanitarian
protection in cases of asymmetrical conflicts. However, when
examining the decision in light of the position of the Appeals

Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
58.
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, 7 115 (June 27).
585-88.
59.
See Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-T,
See id.
595, 605.
60.
595, 607-08.
61.
See id.
62.
See Prosecutor v. Tadii, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Separate and Dissenting
Opinion of Judge McDonald Regarding the Applicability of Article 2 of the Statute, § I
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997).
63.
See id. § II.
64.
See id.
Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, 7 68-74 (Int'l Crim.
65.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia (Jul. 15, 1999), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/
enltad-aj990715e.pdf [perma.cc/7FYY-K7X3] (archived Jan. 28, 2016).
Id. 162.
66.
67.
This case is mostly famous for its role as a symbol of the fragmentation of
international law. See, e.g., Martti Koskenniemi & Paivi Leino, Fragmentation of
International Law? Postmodern Anxieties, 15 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 553, 555 (2002);
Pemmaraju Sreenivasa Rao, Multiple InternationalJudicial Forums: A Reflection of
the Growing Strengths of InternationalLaw or Its Fragmentation?,25 MICH. J. INT'L L.
929, 956-58 (2003); Ruti Teitel & Robert Howse, Cross-Judging:Tribunalization in a
Fragmented but Interconnected Global Order, 41 N.Y.U. J. INTL L. & POL. 959, 962
(2008). Too little attention was devoted to the substantive issue of its influence on the
classification of armed conflicts.
Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-A, 19.
68.
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Chamber throughout the entire judgment, as well as other decisions
of the Appeals Chamber, this seems to be the most reasonable
explanation for its decision. 69 The Appeals Chamber adopted a
teleological approach that emphasized the importance of enhancing
70
accountability even at the price of deviation from "legal formalities."
This flexibility, which expresses itself in the "overall control" test,
was applied by the Appeals Chamber only to situations involving
armed groups and not to each and every situation of state
responsibility. 71 This application echoes the criticism made by
Theodor Meron of the Trial Chamber's decision, which stressed the
importance of teleological interpretation, specifically in the context of
humanitarian law conventions. 72 Moreover, the Appeals Chamber's
classification was not a standalone decision; but rather, it reflected
the tendency in the international law literature to classify the conflict
73
in the former Yugoslavia as an IAC.

See Luban, supra note 1, at 329 (describing the Appeals Chamber's
69.
classification as "a paradigm example of the IHL vision").
70.
Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-A, 121.
71.
Id.
131-32.

72.

See Theodor Meron, Classification of Armed Conflict in the Former

Yugoslavia: Nicaragua's Fallout, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 236, 239 (1998) ("In interpreting the
law, our goal should be to avoid paralyzing the legal process as much as possible and,
in the case of humanitarian conventions, to enable them to serve their protective
goals.").

73.

See, e.g., George H. Aldrich, Jurisdiction of the International Criminal

Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 64, 66-68 (1996); Theodor Meron,

War Crimes in Yugoslavia and the Development of InternationalLaw, 88 AM. J. INT'L L.
78, 81-82 (1994); James C. O'Brien, The International Tribunal for Violations of

InternationalHumanitarianLaw in the Former Yugoslavia, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 639, 647
(1993). But see Christopher Greenwood, International Humanitarian Law and the
Tadid Case, 7 EUR. J. INT'L L. 265, 272-74 (1996). Indeed, in its Interlocutory Appeal
decision, the Appeals Chamber rejected the claim that a single JAC had taken place
and determined that the situation had both internal and international aspects. See
Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 77 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Oct. 2, 1995). This position was criticized for enabling "the creation of a crazy quilt of
norms that would be applicable in the same conflict" and thus for "the potential for
unequal and inconsistent treatment of the accused." MERON, supra note 36, at 238. The
Appeals Chamber's decision was limited, however, in the sense that it did not
determine the actual classification of the specific conflict. Greenwood, supra, at 274.
Moreover, this decision seems to have been based, at least partially, on a parallel
concern to avoid a "crazy quilt of norms"; that is, the concern that classifying the
conflict as an IAC would exclude Bosnian Serbs from protected persons status due to
their Bosnian nationality, while regarding the Bosnian civilians as protected persons
since the actions of the Bosnian Serbs would be considered acts of the Federal Republic
76. The exclusion of victims from
of Yugoslavia. See Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72,
protected person status indeed raises a humanitarian concern. However, this concern
was rightly criticized as being "unconvincing and potentially dangerous," since the
tribunal's interpretation of protected person status was not inevitable. Indeed, in its
judgment in the Tadid case, the Appeals Chamber decided that Bosnian Serb victims
ought to be regarded as protected persons, and adopted the inclusive approach to the
classification of the conflict. See Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment,
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More generally, the inclusive approach to classification can be
seen as part of the tribunal's tendency to narrow the normative gap
between international and non-international armed conflicts. The
best known example of the use of the inclusive approach by the
tribunal is the Tadi6 Appeals Chamber's October 1995 decision on the
Interlocutory Appeal on jurisdiction ruling, which was delivered four
years before the Appeals Judgment discussed above, particularly with
regard to the scope of customary law norms applicable to internal
armed conflicts. 74 In its decision, the Appeals Chamber not only
recognized a broad set of norms as applying equally to IACs and
NIACs but also explicitly questioned the justification of the
separation between the two types of armed conflicts. 7 5 It also
recognized the violation of many of these norms as international
crimes. This approach suffers from a less than convincing
methodology in recognizing customary IHL,7 6 which strengthens the
indication that its normative consequences played an important role
in the court's decision. The Appeals Chamber repeated this position
in subsequent cases, which endorsed the "overall control" test and the
classification of the conflict as an IAC. 7 7 The tribunal's position
regarding the scope of customary IHL is a good example of the
inclusive approach, in which interpretive tools have been used to
mitigate the vagueness and limited protection of the treaty norms
that govern asymmetrical armed conflicts. 7 8 This example of the
inclusive approach is not part of the classification debate but rather
an interpretive way to decrease the need for a classification debate
164-69 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia (Jul. 15, 1999). The Trial
Chamber in the (elebi6i case had already adopted this position prior to the Tadid
Appeal Judgment. See Prosecutor v. Delalik, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment,
23666 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998), http://www.icty.org!
xlcases/mucic/tjug/enl981116judg-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/SAR4-438K] (archived Feb.
8, 2016).
74.
See Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72.
75.
See id.
97 ("[In] the area of armed conflict the distinction between
interstate wars and civil wars is losing its value as far as human beings are concerned.
Why protect civilians from belligerent violence, or ban rape, torture or the wanton
destruction of hospitals, churches, museums or private property, as well as proscribe
weapons causing unnecessary suffering when two sovereign States are engaged in war,
and yet refrain from enacting the same bans or providing the same protection when
armed violence has erupted 'only' within the territory of a sovereign State? If
international law, while of course duly safeguarding the legitimate interests of States,
must gradually turn to the protection of human beings, it is only natural that the
aforementioned dichotomy should gradually lose its weight.")
76.
See, e.g., Greenwood, supranote 73, at 277-78.
77.
See Prosecutor v. Delalik, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment,
17-20, 172
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001), http://www.icty.org
xdcases/mucic/acjug/en/cel-aj010220.pdf [https://perma.cc/7VH2-QNEM] (archived Feb.
8, 2016).
78.
See Sandesh Sivakumaran, Re-envisaging the International Law of
Internal Armed Conflict, 22 EuR. J. INT'L L. 219, 228-32 (2011) [hereinafter
Sivakumaran, Re-envisaging] (describing the attempt to fill the normative vagueness of
internal armed conflicts through the applications of customary IHL).
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altogether by narrowing the normative gap between the two types of
conflicts. 79 The inclusive approach to classification comes into play in
those areas where the interpretive exercise has not succeeded in fully
eliminating the gap between JAC and NIAC. This gap in protection is
most apparent in international criminal law (ICL) where, in spite of
significant progress, the number of international crimes is larger in
the case of an JAC than in the case of an NIAC. 80 Nonetheless, the
inclusive approach is not limited to ICL. A similar approach can be

found, for example, in the ICRC customary IHL study.8 1 This study
suggests that the vast majority of customary norms applicable in
IACs also apply in NIACs, even though these norms do not
82
necessarily appear in the treaty norms that govern NIACS.
If the inclusive interpretive approach to customary law had
resulted in similar norms applying equally in both types of conflicts,
it would have made the whole question of classification redundant.
However, although the ICRC went quite far in its approach, 83 it does
not recognize prisoner of war status in NIACs. Thus, it does not apply

79.
See Benvenisti, The Legal Battle, supra note 39, at 347 ("No longer bound
by parties' consent, third parties, acting separately or collectively, can overcome power
disparities between the parties to the conflict and the contingencies of this new type of
asymmetric combat. The rise of international criminal law cannot be explained
otherwise. Moreover, its applicability to internal armed conflicts must be attributed to
the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia
('ICTY), which has in only a few years of adjudicating war crimes in the former
Yugoslavia virtually rewritten the law on internal armed conflicts. By formally
asserting the laws customary status, the ICTY overcame years of governmental
resistance to regulating methods for fighting insurgents.")
80.
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8, July 12,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 900. This difference might be mitigated in the future, For
instance, following the Kampala Review Conference in 2010, the crime of "employing
asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices"
was added to the list of crimes for non-international armed conflicts. However, the
amendment applies only to state parties that have ratified it, and thus far only twentysix states have ratified. Id. ch. 18.
81.
See JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, INT'L COMM. OF
THE RED CROSS, I CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAw (2005).
Another example of an approach which resembles the "inclusive approach"
82.
is the minimum humanitarian standards project, which aims at granting fundamental
protections in all situations regardless of classification. See Theodor Meron & Allan

Rosas, A Declaration of Minimum HumanitarianStandards, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 375,
376 (1991).
83.
According to the ICRC customary law study, the vast majority of
customary norms apply equally in both types of conflict. For criticisms of the study's
approach to non-international armed conflicts, see John B. Bellinger, III & William J.

Haynes, II, A U.S. Government Response to the International Committee of the Red
Cross Study Customary International Humanitarian Law, 89 INT'L REV. RED CROSS
443, 447, 454, 460, 465 (2007) (criticizing, inter alia, the tendency of the study to
acknowledge the customary status of norms in IACs, without sufficient evidence to
support the extension of such customary norm to NIACs). Contra Jean-Marie

Henckaerts, Customary International Humanitarian Law: A Response to U.S.
Comments, 89 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 473, 485-87 (2007) (defending the methodological
approach of the study with regard to NIACs).
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combatant immunity, which accompanies this status, in these armed
conflicts. As explained above, the absence of combatant immunity in
NIACs is a major obstacle to the ability of the law to effectively
mitigate suffering during armed conflicts. Even if one accepts the
position of the ICRC customary study, there are still good reasons for
adopting an inclusive approach to classification.
B. The Exclusive Approach: The Classification of Transnational
Armed Conflicts
The so-called war on terror brought IHL once again to the
forefront of the international law discourse. The normative debate
over the law that governs transnational armed conflicts involves
several core issues, one of them being the classification of such
conflicts.84
One may assume that the same rationale behind the
classification of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia would lead
humanitarian actors to the classification of transnational armed
conflicts as IACs: if the regime of NIAC is less protective than the
parallel regime of IAC, then classification of transnational armed
conflicts as IACs is preferable from a humanitarian perspective.
Indeed, the inclusive approach did not disappear, and the call for
85
abandoning the separation between IAC and NIAC is still heard.
Nonetheless, it seems that the overwhelming majority of actors,
including the majority of humanitarian actors, 86 classify these
conflicts as NIACs. 8 7 If this were a case of simple interpretation,

See infra note 98.
84.
See, e.g., Emily Crawford, Unequal Before the Law: The Case for the
85.
Elimination of the Distinction Between International and Non-International Armed
Conflicts, 20 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 441, 453-57 (2008); James G. Stewart, Towards a
Single Definition of Armed Conflict in InternationalHumanitarianLaw: A Critique of
InternationalizedArmed Conflict, 85 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 313, 314 (2003).
86.
It is not an easy task to divide these actors into groups. However, at least
some of these authors admit that they belong to a specific ideological group. See, e.g.,
Marko Milanovic, Norm Conflicts, International Humanitarian Law, and Human
Rights Law, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW 95, 95-96 (Orna Ben-Naftali ed., 2011) [hereinafter Milanovic, Norm
Conflicts] ("At the outset it must be said that this is not an abstract academic
endeavour, but rather a pragmatic and practical project designed to have a real-life
impact.. . The first, and broadest, is the affirmation of an idea: the law applicable in
war is no longer solely a law between sovereigns who agree out of grace and on the
basis of reciprocity to limit themselves in their struggles in order to reduce the
suffering of innocent people. Rather, human beings embroiled in armed conflict retain
those rights that are inherent in their human dignity, which are more-not lessimportant in wartime than in peacetime, and which apply regardless of considerations
of reciprocity between warring parties.").
87.
See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 629-36 (2006); INT'L COMM.
OF THE RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF
CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS 10 (2011) [hereinafter ICRC CHALLENGES 2011];
SIVAKUMARAN, supra note 25, at 229; Derek Jinks, September 11 and the Laws of War,
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where it is clear that only one classification is possible, there would
be no real puzzle regarding the classification. Indeed, in many cases,
the classification is presented by its supporters as the inevitable
result of the interpretive exercise.8 8 In an era where the law has
moved away to a large extent from a formalistic, deterministic
understanding of legal interpretation, 8 9 and in light of some
alternative interpretive options for the classification of transborder
armed conflicts, 9 0 this classification raises a question and calls for a
closer examination of the possible reasons for the adoption of this
interpretive approach. The following sections argue that the exclusive
approach might be based on a competing normative approach to the
inclusive approach.
1. The Exclusive Approach: Transnational Armed Conflicts as NonInternational Armed Conflicts
The starting point for most authors when discussing the
classification of transnational armed conflicts is that common article
2 (CA2) of the Geneva Conventions, 91 which defines the notion of

28 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 38 (2003); Claus Krell, Some Reflections on the International

Legal Framework Governing Transnational Armed Conflicts, 15 J. CONFLICT &
SECURITY L. 245, 255-57 (2010); David Kretzmer, Targeted Killings of Suspected

Terrorists:Extra-JudicialExecutions or Legitimate Means of Defence?, 16 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 171, 210 (2005) [hereinafter Kretzmer, Targeted Killings; Noam Lubell, The War (?)
Against Al-Qaeda, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS 421,
431-36 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst ed., 2012) [hereinafter Lubell, The War Against AlQaeda];Marko Milanovic & Vidan Hadzi-Vidanovic, A Taxonomy of Armed Conflict, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 256, 305 (Nigel
D. Whuite & Christian Henderson eds., 2013); Sean D. Murphy, Evolving Geneva

Convention Paradigms in the "War on Terrorism". Applying the Core Rules to the
Release of Persons Deemed "Unprivileged Combatants", 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1105,
1136-140 (2007); Andreas Paulus & Mindia Vashakmadze, Asymmetrical War and the

Notion of Armed Conflict-A Tentative Conceptualization,91 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 95,
111-12 (2009); Marco Sassbli, Use and Abuse of the Laws of War in the "War on
Terrorism" 22 L. & INEQ. 195, 200-01 (2004) [hereinafter Sass51i, Use and Abuse]; lain
Scobbie, Gaza, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS 280, 301
(Elizabeth Wilmshurst ed., 2012); lain Scobbie, Lebanon 2006, in INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS 387, 409-10 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst ed., 2012)
[hereinafter Scobbie, Lebanon 2006]; Sylvain Vit6, Typology of Armed Conflicts in

InternationalHumanitarianLaw: Legal Concepts and Actual Situations, 9 INT'L REV.
RED CROSS 69, 91-92 (2009). But see HCJ 769/02 Public Committee Against Torture in
Israel v. Government of Israel PD 62(1) 507 [2005]; Dapo Akande, Classification of

Armed

Conflicts: Relevant Legal Concepts, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE

CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS 32, 57-67 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst ed., 2012).
88.
See, e.g., Paulus & Vashakmadze, supra note 87, at 111-12; Sassd1i, Use
and Abuse, supra note 87, at 200-01.
89.
See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 91-98; MAR ITI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM
APOLOGY TO UTOPIA (2005); Michel Rosenfeld, Deconstructionand Legal Interpretation:
Conflict, Indeterminacy and the Temptations of the New Legal Formalism, 11 CARDOzO
L. REV. 1211, 1211 (1989).
90.
See supra part II.B.2.
91.
See, e.g., GC III, supranote 19, art. 2.
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IAC, does not apply to conflicts between a state and a non-state
armed group. 92 This position is based on a plain reading of the CA2
text, which limits its application only to "armed conflict which may
arise between two or more of the high contracting parties," 93 meaning
only conflicts between two states. This reading is often presented as
an almost trivial interpretation that requires no further
consideration. 94 CA3, which deals with NIACs, refers to an "armed
conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of
one of the High Contracting Parties . . ."95 A plain textual reading of
CA3 suggests that it refers only to internal armed conflicts, due to the
allusion to the territory of the state party in the text. 96 Moreover, the
reality of transnational armed conflicts was not part of the discussion
that led to the adoption of the Geneva Conventions, and the drafters
of CA3 seem to have imagined only internal armed conflicts when the
article was created. 97 This analysis equally applies to the definition of
NIAC in AP2, which refers to conflicts "which take place in the
territory of a High Contracting Party. .

)98
...

Following this formalistic reading of CA2, most authors have
concluded that it does not apply to transnational armed conflicts. 99 In
contrast to the formalistic approach to CA2, these authors have
adopted a much more flexible interpretive approach in the case of
CA3, suggesting that an alternative textual interpretation of CA3
exists: the reference to a territory of one of the high contracting
parties does not refer to the territory of a party to the conflict; but
rather, to the requirement that the conflict should take place in the
territory of one of the parties to the convention for CA3 regarding
NIAC to apply. 10 0 In addition, it has been suggested that the use of
the term "non-international armed conflicts" rather than "internal
armed conflicts" further supports the position that any conflict that is
not international is a non-international armed conflict. 10 1 Another
possibility is that even if only the effects of the attacks are felt within

92.
See, e.g., Jinks, supra note 87, at 11; Sassbli, Use and Abuse, supra note 87,
at 199.
93.
See, e.g., GC III, supranote 19, art. 2.
94.
See, e.g., Jinks, supra note 87, at 11-12; Scobbie, Lebanon 2006, supra note
87, at 409 ("It is generally accepted that an international armed conflict within the
terms of the Geneva Conventions can only exist between States..
95 GC III, supra note 19, art. 3.
96.
See, e.g., Lubell, The War Against Al-Qaeda, supra note 87, at 435;
Milanovic & Hadzi-Vidanovic, supra note 87, at 288.
97.
Bartels, supra note 20, at 66; Milanovic & Hadzi-Vidanovic, supra note 87,
at 288.
98.
Protocol II, supra note 27, art. 1(1).
99.
This applies to all the authors that classify transnational armed conflicts
as NIAC. See supra note 87.
100.
See, e.g., Sassbli, Use and Abuse, supranote 87, at 201.
101.
See, e.g., Lubell, The War Against Al-Qaeda, supra note 87, at 434; Sasscli,
Use and Abuse, supra note 87, at 200.
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the territory of the state party, this suffices to bring CA3 into play.
This textual interpretation is not supported by the preparatory work
of the Geneva Conventions. 102 To the contrary, the article seems to
have been designed for and intended to apply only to internal
conflicts. The delegates to the diplomatic conference referred to
internal conflicts (and in some instances to colonial wars that
resemble civil wars), 10 3 and their substantive arguments focused on
concerns regarding possible limitations on their sovereign rights with
respect to their own nationals.104
Some authors offer, in addition to the textual interpretation, a
normative argument that suggests that the law of NIAC might be a
more suitable legal framework for the regulation of conflicts in which
non-state armed groups participate, 105 particularly since the norms
of IACs were specifically designed for state actors and did not take
into consideration non-state armed groups. This argument seems to
be relevant only to some types of asymmetrical conflicts, in which the
armed groups are relatively weak and unorganized. In some of the
main contemporary asymmetrical conflicts, it is reasonable to assume
that armed groups, which are well organized and have control over all
or part of a territory, are capable of complying with most norms of

102.
Without entering the general debate on treaty interpretation, this seems to
be a situation for the invocation of Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, which allows the recourse to preparatory work in cases of an ambiguous
meaning. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31-32, opened for signature
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna
Convention],
https://treaties.un.org/doclPublication/UNTSVolume%201155/volume1155-I-18232-English.pdf [https://perma.cc/HU2B-S3XW] (archived Feb. 8, 2016).
103.
See, e.g., U.N. Special Comm., II Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference
of Geneva of 1949, sec. B, at 41.
104.
Perhaps the clearest example of both the reference to civil wars and the
sovereignty concerns can be found in the words of Leland Harrison, the United States
delegate to the diplomatic conference, who explicitly used the relevant words of the
article in a way that emphasizes its territorial scope: "The convention would therefore
be applicable in all cases of declared war between states, parties to the convention, and
to certain armed conflicts within the territory of a state party to the convention. Every
government had a right to put down rebellion within its borders and to punish the
insurgents in accordance with its penal laws. Conversely, premature recognition of the
belligerency of insurgents was a tortuous act against the lawful government and a
breach of international law. The United States of America therefore considered that
the convention should be applicable only where the parent government had extended
recognition to the rebels ....
Id. at 12. Similar positions were expressed by, among
others, the delegates of the United Kingdom, France, Greece, Mexico, Norway, Spain,
Canada, Monaco and Burma. See id. at 10-15, 40-48, 76-79,82-84, 93-95, 97-102,
325-39.
105.
See, e.g., Lubell, The War Against Al-Qaeda, supra note 87, at 434 ("Nonstate actors would be unable to comply with many of the international armed conflict
provisions, and States would be unwilling to grant non-state actors immunities from
prosecution granted to prisoners of war in conflicts of this type."); Sivakumaran, Reenvisaging,supra note 78, at 237-38.

20161

CLASSIFICATION OF ASYMMETRICAL CONFLICTS

IAC. 10 6 This is the case, for example, with respect to the conflict
between Israel and Hamas, the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah,
and possibly the recent conflict between the United States and
several other states and ISIL. In addition, the same argument about
the unsuitability of the law of IAC could also be made regarding an
IAC between a state and a failed state that is unable to comply with
all of the requirements of the law of IAC. Moreover, the same authors
accept the possibility of an IAC between a state and a non-state
armed group both in situations of state control over such a group and
in Article 1(4) of API situations, 107 that is, situations in which the
same concerns regarding the compatibility of IAC norms arise.
The heart of the normative argument of the exclusive approach
lies elsewhere. It is the result of a normative position that focuses on
the protective goal of IHL. 10 8 As Marco Sass6li states, "[F]rom the
perspective of the aim and purpose of IHL, the latter interpretation
[classification as NIAC] must be correct, as there would otherwise be
a gap in protection, which could not be explained by States' concerns
about their sovereignty."'10 9 According to Sassbli, the exclusive
approach should be endorsed since it is the best out of only two viable
interpretive options-the classification of the conflict as a NIAC or,
alternatively, the inapplicability of any form of IHL norms to these
conflicts.
Indeed, a formalistic reading of both articles might lead to the
conclusion that IHL treaty law does not apply to this new kind of
transnational armed conflict. This formalistic interpretation was
endorsed by the first Bush administration1 10 and is the apologetic
mirror image of the utopian position of the exclusive approach that
lies at the heart of this Article. Criticism of the apologetic approach to
classification is beyond the scope of this Article and has been

106.
These conflicts resemble AP2 conflicts. The above criticism of the
capabilities argument applies, of course, to all of these conflicts, regardless of a
transnational element.
107.
See NOAM LUBELL, EXTRATERRITORIAL USE OF FORCE AGAINST NON-STATE
ACTORS 96-98 (2010); SIVAKUMARAN, supra note 25, at 212-22, 225-28.
108.
See, e.g., Elizabeth Holland, The Qualification Framework of International
HumanitarianLaw: Too Rigid to Accommodate Contemporary Conflicts?, 34 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 145, 159-69 (2011); Jinks, supra note 87, at 40-41; Lubell, The
War Against Al-Qaeda, supranote 87, at 435; Sassbli, Use and Abuse, supra note 87, at
201.
109.
Sass6li, Use and Abuse, supranote 87, at 201.
110.
See Brief for Respondents at 37-40, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557
(2006) (No. 05-184); Memorandum from the President of the United States, to the Vice
President, on Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002)
[hereinafter
Bush
Memorandum],
http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdflmemol 1.pdf
[perma.cc/2ZTS-2LYJ] (archived Jan. 24, 2016); Memorandum from U.S Department of
Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, to William Haynes II, General Counsel, Department of
Defense, on Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Jan.
[perma.cc/
9, 2002), http://www.justice.gov/olc/docs/memo-laws-taliban-detainees.pdf
KAQ8-QWMI (archived Jan. 24, 2016).
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addressed in detail by other authors. 1 11 Since this conclusion is
highly problematic from a humanitarian perspective, an interpretive
exercise is needed in order to apply IHL norms to such conflicts.
However, this humanitarian concern does not necessarily mandate
deviation from a plain interpretation of CA3. An alternative solution
might be found in widening the definition of IAC. If transnational
armed conflicts can be classified as IACs following an interpretive
exercise, then, following the rationale of the inclusive approach,
classification of such conflicts as IACs seems to better serve the
humanitarian purpose, as well as the pragmatic compromise of
IHL. 112 The next section of this Article demonstrates that this is
indeed the case: the classification of transnational armed conflicts as
IACs is a reasonable interpretive position. Therefore, a closer
examination of the motives behind the classification of transnational
armed conflicts is needed.
2. An Alternative Interpretation: Transnational Armed Conflicts as
International Armed Conflicts
The seminal cases in which transnational armed conflicts were
classified as IACs are the Supreme Court of Israel's decisions
regarding the classification of Israel's asymmetrical conflicts with the
113
Palestinians and Hezbollah, especially the Targeted Killings case.
In this case, the court discussed very briefly the classification
question and concluded that the conflict between Israel and
Palestinian armed groups is an IAC. 1 14 The court determined, relying
on a legal opinion by Antonio Cassese who served as expert witness
for the petitioners, that any armed conflict within the context of an
occupation should always be classified as an IAC. 115 The court did not
limit its position to the context of an occupation and defined an IAC

111.
See, e.g., Kretzmer, Rethinking, supra note 42, at 11 (discussing the
legitimizing role of IHL as a basis for the apologetic approach to classification); Marko

Milanovic, Lessons for Human Rights and HumanitarianLaw in the War on Terror:
Comparing Hamdan and the Israeli Targeted Killing Case, 89 INT'L REV. RED CROSS
373, 377 (2007) ("It must be noted that it certainly takes some audacity to cite the
Martens Clause, of all things, which embodies the humanitarian spirit of the laws of
armed conflict, as support for the thesis that there are armed conflicts which are
governed by the law of war but are not regulated by it, and all for the purpose of
torturing suspected terrorists for information.").
See supra Part I.
112.
113.
See HCJ 769/02 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v.
Government of Israel PD 62(1) 507 [2005]; CrimA 6659/06, Anonymous v. State of
Israel PD 62(4), 329 (2008).

114.

See Public Committee Against Torture in Israel, HCJ 769/02,

18. A

possible explanation for the lack of a more comprehensive treatment of classification in
the judgment might be the vague and inconclusive positions regarding the
classification issue in both the petitioners' and the respondents' briefs, which might
suggest that it was not a crucial question in the petition. See id. IT 5-7, 11.

115.

Id. T 18.
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as any conflict "that crosses the borders of the state-whether or not
the place in which the armed conflict occurs is subject to belligerent
occupation." 116 In the Unlawful Combatants case, the court repeated
this position. 117 In both cases, the court did not engage with the
language and interpretation of CA2 or CA3. Its interpretive analysis
was limited to the statement that any cross-border armed conflict is
an IAC. 1 18 In contrast to the reliance of the exclusive approach on the
term "non-international" as opposed to "internal" as a starting point
for its interpretation of CA3, the Supreme Court seems to have relied
on its plain understanding of the term "international" as any
situation that is not internal as the basis for its interpretation. This
position relies on the notion that the historical justification for the
distinction between these two types of conflicts is grounded in the
119
notion of territorial sovereignty.
Dapo Akande provides a more elaborate argument for classifying
transnational armed conflicts as IACs. 120 Akande argues that a
transnational conflict against a non-state armed group that takes
place without the consent of the territorial state in which the conflict
occurs is an IAC. 12 1 This interpretation is based on the position that
any use of force on a state's territory, even if it is directed only
against a non-state armed group, is a use of force against the
122
territorial state and gives rise to an IAC between the two states.
This position, as Akande demonstrates, finds support in several
sources, including the UN Commission of Inquiry into the 2006
conflict in Lebanon and the ICJ's classification in the Armed
Activities case. 12 3 Akande argues against the position that in such
conflicts an IAC and an NIAC exist in parallel, the former between
the two states and the latter between the foreign state and the armed
group. 124 According to Akande, it is impossible to separate the
conflicts, since any targeting of the armed group by the foreign state
inevitably targets persons or objects that belong to the territorial
12 5
state.
Another solution could be based on the parallel existence of
transnational IACs in the realm of customary international law, in
addition to the definitions in CA2 and CA3. This approach is similar
to the claim that the recognition of belligerency, which transforms an

116.
117.

Id.
See CrimA 6659/06, Anonymous v. State of Israel PD 62(4),

118.

See Public Committee Against Torture in Israel, HCJ 769/02,

Anonymous, CrimA 6659/06, 9.
119.
See, e.g., supra note 104 and accompanying text.
120.
See Akande, supra note 87, at 70-79.
121.
Id. at 73-74.
122.
Id.
123.
Id. at 75-76.
124.
Id. at 77.
125.
Id.

9 (2008).

18, 21;
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NIAC into an 1AC, exists under customary international law even
after the adoption of CA3 and APII. 12 6 Under this approach, the
treaty norms were not intended to supersede all alternative options
for the application of the entire body of IHL norms. Another example
of this path is the argument raised by those who support the
recognition of transnational armed conflicts as a new category of
armed conflict, governed by customary IHL, which is not dependent
on the classification of the conflict as either an international or a noninternational armed conflict.127
Indeed, all of these interpretive options, which result in the
classification of transnational armed conflicts as IACs, are far from a
simple, formalistic reading of CA2 and CA3, or an undisputed
description of the mainstream understanding of de lege lata.
Nonetheless, these interpretive positions are not different in any
meaningful way from the complex interpretive exercise that is needed
in order to classify transnational armed conflicts as NIACs that fall
within the definition of CA3. In fact, the most convincing textual
interpretation of CA2 and CA3 seems to lead to the conclusion that
they do not apply to transnational armed conflicts at all, as does the
resort to the preparatory work of the conventions. 128 As mentioned,
this was indeed the position that was initially adopted by the U.S.
administration. 129 The (justified) reluctance to accept the reality of a
legal black hole was the main reason for the adoption of these
creative
interpretations,
taking into
account
the overall

126.

See, e.g., Tom Farer, HumanitarianLaw and Armed Conflicts: Toward the

Definition of "InternationalArmed Conflict" 71 COLUM. L. REV. 37, 69 (1971); Yair M.

Lootsteen, The Concept of Belligerency in International Law, 166 MIL. L. REV. 109,
127-39 (2000); Konstantinos Mastorodimos, Belligerency Recognition: Past, Present
and Future,29 CONN. J. INT'L L. 301, 311-18 (2014).
127.
See Kretzmer, Targeted Killings, supra note 87, at 195 (arguing that
customary IHL norms apply to situations not covered by CA2 and CA3); Roy S.

Sch6ndorf, Extra-State Armed Conflicts: Is There a Need for a New Legal Regime?, 37
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 54-62 (2005) (arguing that core IHL principles apply as a
matter of customary law to armed conflicts that do not fall within the definitions of

CA2 and CA3); see also Geoffrey Corn, Hamdan, Lebanon, and the Regulation of
Hostilities: The Need to Recognize a Hybrid Category of Armed Conflict, 40 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 295, 327-29 (2007) (arguing for the adoption of a similar approach, but
not basing this position on existing customary international law). Contra Milanovi6,
Norm Conflicts, supra note 86, at 304 (arguing that this approach is not part of de lege

lata).
128.
A comprehensive account of the role, and possible efficient use, of the
Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties' (VCLT) rules of interpretation as a tool to
increase the uniformity and predictability of interpretation lies outside the scope of this
Article. In any case, the use of the VCLT's rules of interpretation does not seem to be
able to easily resolve the interpretive debate over classification, since a textual
interpretation may be in tension with the overall purpose of the treaty, which leaves
the interpreter with relatively extensive interpretive discretion. See Vienna
Convention, supra note 102, arts. 31-33.
129.
See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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humanitarian purpose of the treaties. 130 Acknowledgment of the
abovementioned complexity and indeterminacy of the legal rules,
together with the possibility of adopting the inclusive approach as a
solution to the "legal black hole problem," as was done in previous
conflicts and with regard to other interpretive questions, calls for
further examination of the motives behind the exclusive approach.

IV. THE BATTLE OVER THE LAWS OF WAR-IHL, IHRL, AND THE
CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS

In order to understand the possible basis for the exclusive
approach, it is necessary to take a step back and focus on a wider and
more fundamental debate regarding the desirable legal regime to
regulate armed conflicts. Numerous books and articles discuss the
relationship between IHL and IHRL. This Article does not intend to
contribute to the substantive debate on the relationship between the
two regimes. Instead, it briefly describes the main positions in the
convergence debate as background to the later demonstration of the
way in which this substantive debate influences the classification
debate.
A. The Development of the IHL-IHRL Convergence Debate and the
"Exclusive Approach"
Historically, IHL and IHRL have developed separately, although
both regimes are based to some extent on a common ideal-the need
for the protection of the dignity and integrity of the person. 13 1 The
prevailing view was that the two regimes are mutually exclusive;
they were perceived as a law for peace (IHRL) and a law for war
(IHL). 132
This perception has changed, and today there is a general
consensus that IHRL and IHL co-apply in situations of armed
conflict. 133 Consequently, the current debate focuses almost

130.
See, e.g., Sass6li, Use and Abuse, supra note 87, at 201.
131.
See Cordula Droege, The Interplay Between International Humanitarian
Law and InternationalHuman Rights Law in Situations of Armed Conflict, 40 ISR. L.
REV. 310, 312 (2007).
132.
See Robert Kolb, The Relationship Between InternationalHumanitarian
Law and Human Rights Law: A Brief History of the 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 38 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 409 (1998);
Heike Krieger, A Conflict of Norms: The Relationship Between HumanitarianLaw and
Human Rights Law in the ICRC Customary Law Study, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L.
265, 266 (2006); see also Orna Ben-Naftali & Yuval Shany, Living in Denial: The
Application of Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, 37 ISR. L. REV. 17, 27-33
(2004) (discussing the different justifications of the mutual exclusivity approach).
133.
Even states that traditionally adopted the mutual exclusivity approach
seem to be beginning to change their position. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Fourth
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exclusively on the scope of the application of IHRL during armed
conflicts. 13 4The seminal case, which represents the co-application of
the two regimes during armed conflicts, is the ICJ's Nuclear Weapons
case, which states the following:
The Court observes that the protection of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights does not cease in times of war, except by operation of
Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain provisions may be derogated from in
a time of national emergency. Respect for the right to life is not, however, such
a provision. In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one's life
applies also in hostilities. The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life,
however, then falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the
law applicable in armed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of
hostilities. Thus whether a particular loss of life, through the use of a certain
weapon in warfare, is to be considered an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary
to Article 6 of the Covenant, can only be decided by reference to the law
applicable in armed conflict and not deduced from the terms of the Covenant
13 5
itself.

The considerations that formed the basis of the initial debate
regarding the co-application of IHL and IHRL have not disappeared
as a result of this judgment, however, and they continue to govern the
current discussion on the scope of convergence of the two legal
regimes. 13 6 For the purposes of this Article, it suffices to present the
two main legal approaches, which represent competing views
regarding the role of human rights in armed conflicts: the first
Periodic Report of the United States of America to the United Nations Committee on
Human Rights Concerning the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
506, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USAI4 (Dec. 30, 2011), [hereinafter U.S. Fourth Periodic
Report] ("[A] time of war does not suspend the operation of the Covenant to matters
within its scope of application."). But see U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of
Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant Pursuant to the
Optional Reporting Procedure, Fifth Periodic Reports of States Parties Due in 2013,
Israel, 67, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/ISR4 (Nov. 17, 2014) ("Israel recognizes that there is a
profound connection between human rights and the Law of Armed Conflict, and that
there may well be a convergence between these two bodies-of-law in some respects.
However, in the current state of international law and state-practice worldwide, it is
Israel's view that these two systems-of-law, which are codified in separate instruments,
remain distinct and apply in different circumstances.").
134.
See, e.g., Droege, supra note 131, at 314; Noam Lubell, ParallelApplication
of International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law: An

Examination of the Debate, 40 ISR. L. REV. 648, 650 (2007) [hereinafter Lubell, Parallel
Application].

135.
Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict,
Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 66, 25 (July 8). There were, of course, earlier
manifestations of the co-application approach, which include, inter alia, Protocol I,
supra note 27, art. 72; G.A. Res. 23 (XXIII), Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, U.N.
Doc. AIConf.32/41 (May 12, 1968). For a comprehensive account of the IHL/IHRL
debate prior to the ICJ's Advisory Opinion, see Milanovic, The Lost Origins,supra note
1.
136.
Thus, the contemporary debate over the role of lex specialis resembles the
debate over the mere application of human rights to armed conflicts, since practical
consequence of the approach according to which IHL is the lex specialis and that there
are no normative gaps in IHL is that no IHRL norms apply in armed conflicts.
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remains loyal to the notion of the unique role of IHL in the regulation
of armed conflicts, while the second believes in the centrality of the
concept of human rights even in extreme situations. 137 According to
the first approach, IHL is the lex specialis; consisting of the laws
designed specifically to address situations of armed conflict. It
overrides the lex generalis (IHRL), which was designed to address
situations of peacetime relations between a government and
individuals under its jurisdiction. 1 3 8 The primacy of IHL under this
approach comes into play either through the use of IHL as an
interpretive tool of relevant IHRL norms or the total rejection of the
application of IHRL norms in cases of a clear contradiction between
13 9
the two regimes.
The second approach regarding the relations of IHL and IHRL
assumes a cumulative or complementary application of IHL and
IHRL. According to this approach, both bodies of law can apply
cumulatively to the same situation and each of the two regimes can
influence the other. 14 0 As the Human Rights Committee described
this approach in General Comment No. 31:
The Covenant applies also in situations of armed conflict to which the rules of
international humanitarian law are applicable. While, in respect of certain
Covenant rights, more specific rules of international humanitarian law may be
specially relevant for the purposes of the interpretation of Covenant rights,
both spheres of law are complementary, not mutually exclusive. 141

This second approach consists of several sub-approaches, which
differ in exactly how the two regimes complement each other. One
sub-approach holds that the complementarity question is dependent,

137.
See Milanovic, The Lost Origins, supra note 1, at 1-3 (presenting these two
approaches as "human rights skeptics" and "human rights enthusiasts").
138.
See DEP'T OF DEFENSE, LAW OF WAR MANUAL § 1.6.3.1 (2015) [hereinafter
DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL], http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/imagesflawwar-manuall5.pdf
[http://perma.cc/893T-JPWH] (archived Jan. 27, 2016); Krieger, supra note 132, at 170.
139.
These are the two main possible meanings of the Lex Specialis principle.
See Krieger, supra note 132, at 269-70. For a more comprehensive discussion of this
principle, which is outside the scope of this Article, see, e.g., Droege, supra note 131;
Lubell, ParallelApplications, supra note 134, at 654-56; Milanovic, The Lost Origins,
supra note 1; Milanovic, Norm Conflicts, supra note 86; lain Scobbie, Principle or
Pragmatics? The Relationship Between Human Rights Law and the Law of Armed
Conflict, 14 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 449 (2010).
140.
See Ben-Naftali & Shany, supra note 132, at 103-07.
141.
Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31, Nature of the General
11, U.N. Doe.
Legal Obligation on States Parties to the Covenant,
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004). Arguably, the ICJ has revised its initial position,
moving towards an approach that resembles general comment 31 in its Armed
Activities case, which does not mention the Lex Specialis principle in the Judgment.
See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda),
Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 116, 216 (Dec. 19).
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to a large extent, on the specific type of conflict.142 Thus, for instance,
some scholars argue that in cases of NIAC, IHRL will have a more
important role in complementing lacunas in the existing law. 14 3 The
normative basis of this approach relies both on the relative vagueness
of IHL norms in situations of NIAC and on the importance of IHRL in
144
regulating the relationship between a government and its citizens.
Two recent cases-Hassan v. The United Kingdom in the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and Mohammed v.
Ministry of Defense in the United Kingdom-exemplify this approach
and illustrate the normative differences that can result from the
classification exercise. 14 5 The Hassan case concerned the arrest and
detention of an Iraqi national during the IAC in 2003. The court
decided that no violation of article 5 of the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR) 146 had occurred, although there were no
grounds for detention under this article and no derogation was made
under article 15 of the convention. 14 7 The court held, relying on
articles 31(3)(b) and 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, 14 8 that, in IACs, article 5 should be read in light of the rules
149
of IHL regarding prisoners of war and the detention of civilians.

142.
supra note
territory as
143.

In addition to the discussion below of internal armed conflicts, see Krieger,
132, at 273-74 (discussing situations of international administration of
cases where the "favourable principle of human rights" should apply).
See, e.g., U.S. Fourth Periodic Report, supra note 133,
507; William

Abresch, A Human Rights Law of Internal Armed Conflict: The European Court of
Human Rights in Chechnya, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 741, 746-51 (2005); Kretzmer, Targeted
Killings, supra note 87, at 202; Krieger, supra note 132, at 273-75; Jens Davis Ohlin,
Is Jus in Bello in Crisis?, 11 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 27, 35 (2013); Nancie Prud'homme,

Lex Specialis: Oversimplifying a More Complex and Multifaceted Relationship?,40 ISR.
L. REV. 355, 391 (2007).
144.
See, e.g., Abresch, supra note 143, at 747 ("The rationale that makes resort
to humanitarian law as lex specialis appealing-that its rules have greater specificityis missing in internal armed conflicts."); Krieger, supra note 132, at 275 ("Internal
armed conflicts can be much closer to the regular sphere of application of human rights
law, because they also concern the relation of the individual vis-61-vis his or her
state.").
145.
See Hassan v. United Kingdom, App. No. 29750/09 (Sept. 16, 2014),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.intleng?i=001-146501
[http://perma.cc/2JFQ-CNCV]
(archived
Jan. 27, 2016); Rahmatullah v. Ministry of Def. & Foreign & Commonwealth
Office [2015]
EWCA
Civ
843
(U.K.),
https://www.judiciary.gov.uklwpcontent/uploads/2015/07/serdar-mohammed-v-ssd-yunus-rahmatullah-v-mod-andfco.pdf [http://perma.cc/5CGH-SXCR] (archived Jan. 27, 2016). The court reaffirmed
the previous judgment of the High Court. See Mohammed v. Ministry of
Defense, [2014]
EWHC
1369
(QB)
(U.K),
http://justsecurity.org/wpcontentuploads201405/Serdar-Mohammed-v-SSD-2014.pdf
[http://perma.cc/Q9F53PEP] (archived Jan. 27, 2016).
146.
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, art. 5, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
147.
Hassan,App. No. 29750/09, 98.
148.
See Vienna Convention, supra note 102, art. 31.
149.
Hassan,App. No. 29750/09, 1 104.
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The court stressed that its position was limited to IACs. 150 The
Mohammed case concerned the legality of detention in the context of
an NIAC in Afghanistan. The court held that the law of NIAC does
not provide an independent power to detain, and, therefore, the
ability to detain in the context of an NIAC is based on domestic law
and IHRL. 15 1 The court decided that in the absence of a derogation,
15 2
the detention violated article 5 of the ECHR.
The outcome of these cases is that without explicit derogation,
the ability to detain in NIACs is much more limited than the parallel
ability in LACs. This is not to say that these decisions are necessarily
accurate; in fact, the position of the court in the Mohammed case
regarding the lack of authority to detain under the laws of NIAC is
controversial, 15 3 and the recent General Comment 35 of the Human
Rights Committee (HRC) does not seem to make the issue any less
vague or controversial. 15 4 Nonetheless, the cases emphasize the

Id.
150.
228-94
151.
See Mohammed v. Ministry of Defense, [2014] EWHC 1369,
(QB) (U.K).
152.
Id. 298.
See, e.g., Sean Aughey & Aurel Sari, Sorry Sir, We're All Non-State Actors
153.
Now: A Reply to Hill-Cawthorne and Akande on the Authority to Kill and Detain in
NIAC, EJIL: TALK! (May 9, 2014), http://www.ejiltalk.org/sorry-sir-were-all-non-stateactors-now-a-reply-to-hill-cawthorne-and-akande-on-the-authority-to-kill-and-detainin-niac/ [http://perma.cc/DDM7-Y3MF] (archived Jan. 27, 2016); Sean Aughey & Aurel
Sari, The Authority to Detain in NIACs Revisited: Serdar Mohammed in the Court of
Appeal, EJIL: TALK! (August 5, 2015), http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-authority-to-detain-in[https:/perma.ccWXD5niacs-revisited-serdar-mohammed-in-the-court-of-appeal/
TMQS] (archived Feb. 8, 2016); Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne & Dapo Akande, Does IHL
Provide a Legal Basis for Detention in Non-InternationalArmed Conflicts?, EJIL: TALK!
(May 7, 2014), http://www.ejiltalk.org/does-ihl-provide-a-legal-basis-for-detention-innon-international-armed-conflicts/ [http://perma.cc/Z5HD-DAK6] (archived Jan. 27,
2016); Ezequiel Heffes, Guest Post: Detention in NIACs: A Pledge in Favour of the
5:48
AM),
16,
2014,
JURIS
(May
of
IHL,
OPINIO
Application
http://opiniojuris.org/2014/05/16/guest-post-detention-niacs-pledge-favour-applicationihl] [http://perma.cc/VJ7H-8VRK] (archived Jan. 27, 2016); Derek Jinks, Does IHL
Authorize Detention in NIACs?, JUST SECURITY (May 5, 2014, 9:20 AM),
[http://perma.cc/LNL6http://justsecurity.org/10144/ihl-authorize-detention-niacs/
8HUD] (archived Jan. 26, 2016); Kubo Manik, No Legal Basis Under IHL for Detention
in Non-InternationalArmed Conflicts? A Comment on Serdar Mohammed v. Ministry of
Defence, EJIL: TALK! (May 5, 2014), http://www.ejiltalk.org/no-legal-basis-under-ihl-fordetention-in-non-international-armed-conflicts-a-comment-on-serdar-mohammed-vministry-of-defence/ [http://perma.cc/7XBQ-CYA9] (archived Jan. 27, 2016).
154.
See U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 35: Article 9
64-68 (Dec. 16,
(Liberty and Security of the Person), U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/GC/35,
2014). The general comment stipulates that "[s]ecurity detention authorized and
regulated by and complying with international humanitarian law in principle is not
arbitrary," but it does not address explicitly whether such authority exists in NIAC. Id.
66 with regard to
64. It is possible to argue that the specific reference to IAC in
procedural and substantive norms which limit the ability to derogate, but the absence
of any such specific reference to IAC regarding the authority to detain, is an indication
that the HRC believes that such authority exists in NIAC. See id. 66. However, this
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potential of an extensive application of IHRL in the context of a
NIAC. In addition, it is suggested that IHRL has a greater restrictive
15 5
role in targeting of individuals in NIAC than in JAC.
B. The Role of IHRL in the Regulation of NIACs and the
Classificationof TransnationalArmed Conflicts
The discussion in the previous section shed light on the motives
behind the dominant approach to the classification of transnational
armed conflicts as NIACs. While in the past the alternative to
classification of a conflict as an JAC was the less protective law of
NIACs, today the alternative consists of a mixture of NIAC norms
and IHRL norms. If one accepts the position that IHRL is a favorable
legal regime from a humanitarian point of view, then the
classification of transnational armed conflicts as NIACs is a
convenient avenue for the greater application of IHRL to such
conflicts. 15 6 While it is beyond the scope of this Article to analyze the
potential differences in the level of protection afforded by IHL and
IHRL, it suffices to note that most authors agree that IHRL norms
are more protective than IHL norms regarding targeting and
detention, 15 7 which are the main subjects of controversy in the
discourse on transnational armed conflicts.
A mirror image of the motives behind the classification debate is
presented by David Kretzmer, who describes a shift in the willingness
of states to classify conflicts as armed conflicts. 15 8 In the past, states
were reluctant to recognize the existence of an armed conflict for
several reasons, including the desire of states to avoid IHL regulation
of their conduct and states' concerns with regard to enhancing the
political legitimacy of the other side to the conflict. 15 9 A possible shift
conclusion is not inevitable and General Comment 35 seems to leave the issue
unsettled.
AND

155.
THE

See INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS 35 (2015); ICRC

CHALLENGES 2011, supra note 87, at 20.
156.
But see Natasha Balendra, Defining Armed Conflict, 29 CARDOZO L. REV.
2461, 2502 (2008) ("In some situations, applying IHL as lex specialis will result in
equal or more protections for the individual ....").
157.
See, e.g., Monica Hakimi, A Functional Approach to Targeting and
Detention, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1365, 1381-82 (2012) ("Applying IHL and HRL
concurrently is straightforward when they lead to comparable outcomes. But on
targeting and detention, IHL is understood to be more permissive."); Milanovic, Norm

Conflicts, supra note 86.
158.
See Kretzmer, Rethinking, supra note 42, at 18-22.
159.
See id. at 21-22; see also Abresch, supra note 143, at 755-57 (discussing
the refusal of Russia, Turkey and the United Kingdom to recognize the application of
IHL to their internal conflicts); Avril McDonald, Terrorism, Counter-Terrorismand the
Jus in Bello, in TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES 57,
62 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2002) ('The British Government never recognized the
situation in Northern Ireland as an armed conflict precisely because it did not want to
recognize in the IRA any international legal status.").
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in this position can be seen in recent years. States have started to
recognize the legitimizing role of IHL regarding the ability to use
lethal force in comparison to the limiting effect of IHRL and domestic
law enforcement regulation. 160 The seminal examples of this shift are
the official recognition by both Israel and the United States of the
existence of an armed conflict in their twenty-first century
16 1
asymmetrical conflicts.
Kretzmer's account focuses on the threshold of application of
IHL. He discusses the creation of CA3 in a world where IHRL was
almost irrelevant and suggests that, in light of the legitimizing and
apologetic role of IHL, the more protective norms of IHRL should
provide the normative framework in low intensity internal
conflicts. 16 2 This position is in line with the literature that suggests
that some situations within the "war on terror" do not reach the
threshold of an armed conflict under IHL and therefore law
enforcement norms should govern it. 1 6 3 In the same way, advancing
the application of IHRL in asymmetrical conflicts seems to be an
important consideration in the classification of such conflicts as
NIACs and provides an answer to the initial problem, as Jens Ohlin
writes with regard to a similar approach towards the substance of the
norms of NIACs: "On the other hand, human rights lawyers often
have the opposite interest. They seek to cabin IHL to its lowest
possible ebb, thus increasing the space available for IHRL to fill the
gap. 16 4 This is not to suggest that all those who classify
transnational armed conflicts as NIACs should adopt this
classification for the purpose of replacing IHL with IHRL, but rather
that such considerations play a prominent role, although perhaps not
explicitly. In the overall contemporary classification debate, this may
go some way towards explaining the striking difference between the
classification positions regarding the two types of conflicts discussed
in this Article.

160.
See Kretzmer, Rethinking, supra note 42, at 22-31. For criticism on the
legitimizing role of IHL in the current "war on terror," see, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note
1; Berman, supra note 1. For a historical account of the legitimizing role of IHL, see
Jochnick & Normand, supranote 1.
161.
HCJ 769/02 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of
Israel PD 62(1) 507,
11 [2005] ("[The government of Israel]'s position is ...that the
current conflict between Israel and the terrorist organizations is an armed
conflict.
); Bush Memorandum, supranote 110.
162.
See Kretzmer, Rethinking, supra note 42, at 39-40, 45.
163.
See, e.g., Lubell, The War Against Al-Qaeda, supra note 87, at 441; Mary
Ellen O'Connell, When Is a War Not a War? The Myth of the Global War on Terror, 12
ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 535, 538 (2005) ("Outside the real wars of Afghanistan and
Iraq, al Qaeda's actions and our responses have been too sporadic and low-intensity to
qualify as armed conflict."); Sass6li, Use and Abuse, supranote 87, at 202-03.
164.
Ohlin, supra note 143, at 36.
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As mentioned above, the politics of IHL are often presented as a
binary tension between the LOAC camp and the IHL camp. 165 IHRL
was regarded by many as a parallel, rather than a conflicting,
normative source in the effort to humanize warfare. 16 6 The exclusive
approach to classification helps to rethink the binary description of
the politics of IHL. This Article demonstrates that the politics of IHL
can better be thought of as revealing a tertiary tension within a
triangle comprised of the state apologetics camp, the IHL camp, and
the IHRL camp. According to this more nuanced account of the
politics of IHL, the IHL pragmatic ethos is not only challenged by
state apologetic positions, such as the "legal black hole" position with
regard to the classification of transnational armed conflicts, which
argues that IHL does not apply at all to these conflicts. 16 7 It is also
challenged by the exclusive approach, which limits the role of IHL in
the regulation of these conflicts by providing a greater role for IHRL
norms through the classification of these conflicts as NIAC. These
IHRL norms do not share the basic principles of IHL that form the
basis of the pragmatic compromise of IHL between military necessity
and humanity.
Indeed, the emergence of this triangle can be explained by other
models of decision making. It can be seen as a result of the
institutional politics of different international law regimes. 16 8 For
example, it can be argued that the inclusive approach, and especially
the customary IHL project, is grounded in the ICRC's desire to
maintain the relevance of its expert vocabulary, 169 while the
exclusive approach is a result of the institutional bias of human
rights bodies. This tension provides some explanation for the division
between the exclusive and inclusive approaches. This Article does not
suggest that alternative accounts have no explanatory force but
rather that these accounts cannot fully explain the classification
debate. The debate does not follow exactly the institutional division
between IHL and IHRL experts. The substantive question regarding
the normative desirability of the two regimes in the regulation of

165.
Luban, supra note 1, at 315-16.
166.
See, e.g., Gabriella Blum, Re-envisaging the Law of Internal Armed
Conflict: A Reply to Sandesh Sivakumaran, 22 EUR. J. INT'L L. 265, 265 (2011)
[hereinafter Blum, Re-envisaging] (describing the move to ICL and IHRL as another
tool of humanitarian advocates, in addition to the customary IHL project).
See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
167.
168.
See generally Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law-20
Years Later, 20 EUR. J. INTL L. 7 (2009). For a general description of the different
models of judicial decision-making relevant to a complex interpretive community such
as the legal model, the attitudinal model, the rational choice model and the newinstitutionalist model, see Keren Weinshall-Margel, Attitudinal and Neo-Institutional
Models of Supreme Court Decision Making: An Empirical and Comparative Perspective
from Israel, 8 J. EMPIRIcAL LEGAL STuD. 556, 557-59 (2011).
169.
See Koskenniemi, supranote 168, at 9.
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asymmetrical conflicts seems to play a significant role in the
classification debate in a way that crosses institutional lines. 170
Reconsidering the pragmatic compromise of IHL with regard to
asymmetrical conflicts lies outside the scope of this Article, 17 1 which
only exposes the underlying tension at the basis of the classification
debate and seeks to enable an open discussion of its desirability. In
this regard, it is important to note that the characteristics of
transnational armed conflicts are often, as explained below,
dissimilar to the characteristics of internal armed conflicts. Although
the use of formalistic arguments provides an easier basis for
establishing one's position, the formalistic writing on classification
does not provide an opportunity to engage in a comprehensive
discussion on the normative desirability of the exclusive approach to
classification. The following Part critically evaluates the desirability
of the application of this exclusive approach to transnational armed
conflicts.

V. CRITICAL THOUGHTS ON THE EXCLUSIVE APPROACH IN LIGHT OF THE
IHRL-IHL DEBATE

In addition to exposing the indeterminacy and politics of the
classification of conflicts in a way that has not been discussed before,
stepping out of the formalistic interpretive exercise enables us to
rethink the exclusive approach without the chains of formalistic
arguments. The real interpretive choice is not between the
application of the law of NAC and a legal black hole, but between the
law of NIAC and the law of IAC, and their respective relations to
IHRL. This Part aims to shed light on the major considerations that
should be taken into account when acknowledging the interpretive
choice regarding the classification of transnational armed conflicts.
From a humanitarian perspective, the clear advantage of
classifying transnational armed conflicts as NIACs is, as discussed
above, the application of the more protective IHRL regime to these
conflicts. This advantage is most important in low intensity conflicts

For example, the ICRC, an IHL organization, seem to classify cross-border
170.
armed conflicts between state and non-state armed groups as NIAC. See ICRC
CHALLENGES 2011, supra note 87, at 10.
This issue is much debated in both just war theory and IHL literature. See,
171.
e.g., Benvenisti, The Legal Battle, supra note 39; Michael L. Gross, Asymmetric War,
Symmetrical Intentions:Killing Civilians in Modern Armed Conflict, 10 GLOBAL CRIME
320 (2009); David Rodin, The Ethics of Asymmetric War, in THE ETHICS OF WAR:
SHARED PROBLEMS IN DIFFERENT TRADITIONS 153 (Richard Sorabji & David Rodin eds.,
2006); Marco Sass6li, Introducing a Sliding-Scale of Obligations to Address the
FundamentalInequality Between Armed Groups and States?, 93 INT'L REV. RED CROSS
426 (2011); Yuval Shany, A Rebuttal to Marco Sassdli, 93 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 432
(2011).
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where concerns regarding the legitimating aspect of IHL and the fear
of manipulation and abuse of IHL norms by (at least some) states are
strongest. 172 In this regard, the law of NIAC also has another
possible advantage. The threshold of application of IHL in cases of an
NIAC demands that the violence cross a certain threshold of
intensity, a requirement traditionally believed to be absent in
situations of IAC. 173 As a result, the classification of transnational
armed conflicts as NIACs ensures that in cases of low intensity
violence the applicable regime will only be that of IHRL, since IHL
will not be applicable at all in those situations. 174 The traditional
position regarding the lack of an intensity threshold for IACs,
however, is not grounded in the text of CA2, and in recent years some
support has developed for the recognition of such a threshold even in
conflicts between states. 175 Therefore, it seems possible to apply a
threshold requirement in cases of transnational armed conflicts, even
17 6
if classified as IACs.
In addition, the law of NIAC might be a more suitable legal
framework for the regulation of conflicts in which non-state actors
participate, since the norms of IAC were specifically designed to suit
state actors. 177 However, there are also other concerns that must be
taken into account, some of which are relevant to the general IHLIHRL debate in NIACs, and some that are specifically relevant to
transnational armed conflicts.
First, the inequality of the law of NIAC and the absence of
combatant immunity in such conflicts undermines the legitimacy and

172.
See LUBELL, supra note 107, at 242; Kretzmer, Rethinking, supra note 42,
at 42-43 n.107.
173.
See GC: COMMENTARY, supra note 22, at 32 ("Any difference arising
between two states and leading to the intervention of armed forces is an armed conflict
within the meaning of Article 2 .... ).
174.
See Shany, supra note 1, at 24 n.55 ("At least from one normative aspect,
the Hamdan approach appears to me to be preferable: [w]hile all, or almost all, interstate violence is governed by IHL... IHL applies in non-international contexts only
when violence reaches a high threshold of intensity ... Thus, the move from the 'law
and order' paradigm to the 'armed conflict' paradigm is justified only when the
phenomenon is of such a magnitude that escapes the scope of coverage of 'law and
order' measures. This standard appears to limit the discretion of governments on when
and how to invoke the exceptional powers conferred upon them by the armed conflict
paradigm."). But see Kretzmer, supra note 42, at 40 (arguing that at least with regard
to CA3 the common position is that the threshold of its application is very low as well).
175.
See INT'L LAW ASS'N, FINAL REPORT ON THE MEANING OF ARMED CONFLICT
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010), http://www.ila-hq.org/download.cfm/docidI2176DC63D268-4133-8989A664754F9F87 [http://perma.cc/4RSM-66CK] (archived Jan. 28, 2016).
But see ICRC CHALLENGES 2011, supra note 87, at 7-8.
176.
This debate over the intensity requirement in IACs can essentially be seen
as another manifestation of the same competing positions regarding the desirable legal
framework that should govern violent conflicts. A comprehensive analysis of the
substantive arguments and the underlying ideological tension of this issue lie beyond
the scope of this Article.
177.
See supra Section II.B.1.
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effectiveness of its regulation. Indeed, even if transnational armed
conflicts were classified as IACs, it is doubtful that states would be
willing to recognize that members of armed groups fulfill the criteria
required in order to gain combatant immunity. 178 States are
reluctant to contribute to even a hint of the appearance of legitimacy
on the part of non-state armed groups. In addition, due to the
differences in power, states are less concerned with the consequences
of denial of combatant status, since far fewer state soldiers are
expected to be captured by the armed group. 17 9 However, states also
clearly benefit from adherence to IHL rules by non-state armed
groups, and this might incentivize them to make some compromises if
it will result in more compliance by non-state actors. In addition, the
reluctance to recognize combatant status in transnational armed
conflicts, which involve foreign armed groups, is weaker than the
reluctance to recognize the same status in situations of a local
rebellion, which directly questions the legitimacy of the government
in power. Lastly, if the existence of such status in transnational
armed conflicts was widely recognized in the international law
community, it might generate pressure on states to recognize the
combatant status of members of armed groups who only attack
legitimate targets due to an increased focus on this issue.
Second, there is grave doubt as to whether IHRL imposes
obligations on non-state actors, specifically non-state armed
groups. 180 When IHRL is used as an interpretive tool for norms of

178.
See HCJ 769102 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v.
Government of Israel PD 62(1) 507, 24 [2005] ("[T]he terrorist organizations from the
area, and their members, do not fulfill the conditions for combatants. It will suffice to
say that they have no fixed emblem recognizable at a distance, and they do not conduct
their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.") (citation omitted).
One might argue that this is not a good example, since those organizations openly
admitted that they were directly targeting civilians. It remains to be seen whether in
cases of real fulfillment of the conditions states will still deny combatant status to
members of organized armed groups.
179.
This resembles the reasons for the reluctance of states to sign CA3's
special agreements, presented in Part I. However, signing a bilateral agreement with
an armed group might be perceived as conferring legitimacy on the armed group,
rather than the mere application of a legal norm to its individual members.
180.
The dominant view is that non-state armed groups have no human rights
obligations. See, e.g., MOIR, supra note 18, at 194; Yabl Ronen, Human Rights
Obligationsof TerritorialNon-State Actors, 46 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 21, 47 ("[Alt present,
customary international human rights law does not seem to extend beyond states, nor,
obviously, does treaty law."). There is a growing literature on the possibility that, at
least in some situations, human rights apply to non-state actors, especially in cases
where the armed group controls a territory. See, e.g., ICRC CHALLENGES 2011, supra
note 87, at 14-15 (describing the application of IHRL to non-state actors as de iure lack
of applicability, but possiblly de facto applicable in cases of state-like armed groups);
CRAWFORD, supra note 40, at 127-28; LIESBETH ZEGVELD, THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF
ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 148-51 (2002). However, this
position is controversial and, in any case, only covers some of possible asymmetrical
conflicts. ICL could also potentially mitigate the lack of direct human rights obligations
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NIAC, it does not pose a serious concern. However, applying IHRL
norms to situations of NIAC to fill an alleged lacuna in the law raises
the concern that these norms, at least in some conflicts, obligate only
the state party to the conflict. This undermines the principle of
equality of belligerents, which is another major tool used by IHL to
advance compliance with its norms. 18 1 Indeed, as noted earlier, the
law of asymmetrical warfare suffers from the lack of equality between
the parties to the conflict and a bias in favor of state interests.
Nonetheless, it is very doubtful that introducing further inequality,
binding states by more norms than their opponents, is the right way
to mitigate this inequality.182
Third, the normative position of the exclusive approach relies on
arguments that were focused on internal armed conflicts. There are
significant differences between transnational armed conflicts and
internal armed conflicts that raise doubts regarding the desirability
of the exclusive approach. One of the main arguments in the IHLIHRL debate with regard to internal armed conflicts focuses on the
prominence of IHRL in the context of the relationship between a state
and its nationals. 18 3 This argument loses much of its strength in
transnational armed conflicts, where states usually engage with
foreign fighters. In these circumstances, IHRL cannot be seen as the
regular normative framework for the relationship between the state
1 84
and the members of these armed groups.

Lastly, in order to achieve its protective goal, the exclusive
approach is dependent on its full acceptance: it relies on the adoption
of not only its approach to classification, but also its position
regarding the scope of the application of IHRL norms to NIACs and
the extraterritorial application of IHRL to transnational armed
conflicts. This means that even if one accepts the exclusive approach's
normative value, its desirability is contingent on its adoption in full
on non-state actors. See Kretzmer, Rethinking, supra note 42, at 38. However, the
notion of crimes against humanity captures only part of the relevant human rights
obligations.
181.
See, e.g., Kretzmer, Rethinking, supra note 42, at 37; Sivakumaran, Reenvisaging, supra note 78, at 241-42.
182.
There is some explicit support in the literature for imposing more
demanding obligations on states in modern asymmetrical warfare. See, e.g., Eyal
Benvenisti, The Law on Asymmetric Warfare, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF W. MICHAEL REISMAN 929 (Mahnoush H. Arsanjani
et al. eds., 2011); Gabriella Blum, On a Differential Law of War, 52 HARV. INT'L L.J.
163 (2011). A comprehensive discussion of these views, which do not represent the
majority view, lies outside the scope of this Article.
183.
See supra note 144.
184.
See Blum, Re-envisaging, supra note 166, at 267-68 ("[T]he question
whether the insurgent group is domestic or internationally-based ... affects not only
the pragmatic aspects of the application of any norm, but also the rationale for the
norm to begin with. Consider, for instance, the practice of borrowing from IHRL to
complement IHL: the nationality and area of operation of the non-state actor are
critical for both the jurisprudential and normative bases for applying human rights
obligations.").
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by the relevant actors. Not all actors necessarily accept both
positions. One illustrative example of this concern is Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld. 185 At first glance, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld seems to be a
victory for the exclusive approach. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected
the Bush administration's apologetic position that CA2 and CA3 did
not apply to the conflict with al Qaeda and determined that CA3 did
apply to the armed conflict. 186 The position of the Supreme Court was
18 7
or
interpreted as either a classification of the conflict as an NIAC

as the application of CA3 as part of customary international law
regardless of the specific classification. 188 No matter which
interpretation is adopted, the normative result remains the samethe application of the norms of NIAC to the transnational conflict
189

with al Qaeda.
As mentioned above, this apparent victory for the exclusive
approach is dependent on acceptance of the normative position
regarding the role of IHRL in the regulation of transnational armed
conflicts. This may therefore have been a Pyrrhic victory due to the
reluctance of the United States to apply IHRL norms to these
extraterritorial conflicts. The position of the United States is based on

two separate claims: first, IHRL norms, especially the International
Covenant

on

Civil

extraterritorially,

19 1

and

Political

Rights, 1

90

do

not

apply

and second, the United States endorsed to a

185.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 629-36 (2006).
186.
Id. at 629-30.
187.
See, e.g., Jack M. Beard, The Geneva Boomerang: The Military
Commissions Act of 2006 and U.S. CounterterrorOperations, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 56, 57
(2006); George P. Fletcher, The Hamdan Case and Conspiracy as a War Crime, 4 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 442, 444 (2006); Memorandum from U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of
Legal Counsel, for the Attorney General, Re: Applicability of Federal Criminal Laws
and the Constitution to Contemplated Lethal Operations Against Shaykh Anwar alAwlaqi 24 (Jul. 16, 2010) [hereinafter Drone Memo], https://www.documentcloud.org/
documents/1202849-u-s-drone-memo.html [http://perma.cc/326D-HG7S] (archived Jan.
27, 2016).
See, e.g., Akande, supra note 87, at 77; Eran Shamir-Borer, Revisiting
188.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld's Analysis of the Laws of Armed Conflict, 21 EMORY INT'L L. REV.
601 (2007).
189.
This is not to say that the U.S. Supreme Court has considered both options
and accepted the position of the exclusive approach in the normative debate. The
parties to the case did not raise the option of classifying the conflict as a regular LAC,
but rather debated the legal black hole approach against either the absence of an
armed conflict at all or the classification of the conflict as NIAC. In the same way, in
the Israeli Targeted Killings case, the court did not heard arguments in favor of
classifying the conflict as a NIAC, but rather either as an IAC or not an armed conflict
at all.
190.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
191.
This was a longstanding U.S. position. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights
Comm., United States Responses to Selected Recommendations of the Human Rights
Committee (Oct. 10, 2007) [hereinafter U.S. Responses to the HRC], http://2001(archived
[perma.cc/6D2E-RP2E]
2009.state.gov/documents/organization/100845.pdf
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large extent the lex specialismodel in which IHL completely displaces

IHRL in situations of armed conflict. 19 2 The U.S. position is reflected
in the continued application of IHL and not IHRL norms by the U.S.
administration as well as in several Supreme Court judgments with
respect to detentions and targeted killings in relation to the "war on
terror." 19 3 For example, since the Supreme Court judgment in Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld, 194 detentions of Taliban and al Qaeda suspects are
governed by the laws of war. 195 Despite much criticism, U.S. courts
have accepted the position that such suspects can be held in detention
until the end of hostilities even in the unique circumstances of the

Jan. 28, 2016). Some writers have suggested a possible change in the U.S. position due
to the vague articulation of its position on extraterritoriality in its last periodic report
502-05. However, the
to the HRC. See U.S. Fourth Periodic Report, supra note 133,
recent concluding observations by the committee clearly establish that the U.S.
position remains unchanged. See Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations on
4, U.N Doc.
the Fourth Periodic Report of the United States of America,
CPPR/C/USAJCO/4 (Apr. 23, 2014).
192.
This was also a clear position of the U.S. administration. See U.S.
Responses to the HRC, supra note 191. Currently, the U.S. position is much more
vague and seems to accept some form of moderate complementarity. See U.S. Fourth
506-09. But see Drone Memo, supra note 187, at
Periodic Report, supra note 133,
28-30 (applying only the law of NIAC to targeting of armed groups' fighters in NIAC).
For the Obama administration's position regarding detention and
193.
targeting, see, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. State Dep't, The Obama
Administration and International Law, Speech Given at the Annual Meeting of the
American Society of International Law (Mar. 25, 2010) ("As a nation at war, we must
comply with the laws of war, but detention of enemy belligerents to prevent them from
returning to hostilities is a well-recognized feature of the conduct of armed conflict, as
the drafters of Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II recognized and as our own
Supreme Court recognized in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld. The federal courts have confirmed
our legal authority to detain in the Guantanamo habeas cases.. . as a matter of
internationallaw, the United States is in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda, as well as
the Taliban and associated forces, in response to the horrific 9/11 attacks, and may use
force consistent with its inherent right to self-defense under international law ... a
state that is engaged in an armed conflict or in legitimate self-defense is not required
to provide targets with legal process before the state may use lethal force."),
[http://perma.cc/RZX9-HBUK]
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releaseslremarks/139119.htm
(archived Jan. 28, 2016). The U.S. Supreme Court relied on IHL in several judgments
on the "war on terror," but did not address IHRL at all. For a general discussion of the
role of IHL in the jurisprudence of the court, see David Weissbrodt & Nathaniel H.
Nesbitt, The Role of the United States Supreme Court in Interpretingand Developing
HumanitarianLaw, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1339 (2011).
194.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
195.
See Koh, supra note 193 ("[A]s a matter of international law, this
Administration has expressly acknowledged that international law informs the scope of
our detention authority. Both in our internal decisions about specific Guantanamo
detainees, and before the courts in habeas cases, we have interpreted the scope of
detention authority authorized by Congress in the AUMF as informed by the laws of
war. Those laws of war were designed primarily for traditional armed conflicts among
states, not conflicts against a diffuse, difficult-to-identify terrorist enemy, therefore
construing what is 'necessary and appropriate' under the AUMF requires some
'translation,'
or analogizing principles from the laws of war governing
traditional internationalconflicts.!).
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"war on terror." 196 The recent Department of Defense Law of War
Manual is an important manifestation of the humanitarian concerns
regarding the consequences of the adoption of the exclusive
approach. 197 The Manual endorses a very restrictive position toward
the application of human rights to transnational armed conflicts: it
rejects the extraterritorial applicability of the ICCPR together with a
strict lex specialis approach to the relations between IHL and
IHRL. 198In addition, it holds to the position that, at least in some
areas, the IHL governing NIAC is less restrictive than the IHL
governing NIAC. 199 Thus, instead of the full application of IHL norms
to these transnational armed conflicts, what remains are the vague
and insufficient norms of NIACs without IHRL as a useful
complementary mechanism. The law of NIAC, which serves as a
convenient platform for the application of IHRL in situations of
armed conflict, can equally serve conservative interpretations that
might compromise humanitarian protection in such conflicts. This
danger might be mitigated following a shift in the approach to the
scope of the application of IHRL, and the recent Mohammed v.
Ministry of Defense case may be a step in this direction, 200 but the
potential price of holding idealized positions in a non-ideal world
must be taken into account.

VI. CONCLUSION

IHL is no longer necessarily perceived as the best way to
advance the protection of victims of armed conflicts. IHRL is gaining
more and more influence in this area. This Article has aimed to shed
light on an often neglected area of the normative debate regarding
the desirable legal regime in the regulation of armed conflicts. It
argues that the classification of transnational armed conflicts as
NIACs is based on the desire to decrease the role of IHL in these
conflicts and to allow more space for the application of the more
protective IHRL.
Following its demonstration of the contingent nature of the
classification positions in the interpretive debate regarding
transnational armed conflicts, this Article has argued for a more
conscious and cautious choice of the legal regime that governs such
conflicts. IHL is grounded in the hard reality of life where armed

196.
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521; Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 874 (D.C. Cir.
2010); Eric Talbot Jensen, Guantanamo and the End of Hostilities, 37 S. ILL. U. L.J.
491, 504 (2013).
197.
See DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 138.
198.
Id. §§ 1.6.3.1, 1.6.3.3, 17.2.1.3.
Id. §§ 17.1.3.3, 17.2.2.2.
199.
200.
See Mohammed v. Ministry of Defense, [2014] EWHC 1369 (QB) (UK).
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conflicts are inevitable, at least in the foreseeable future. It swallows
the bitter pill of its legitimating aspects for the benefit of IHL's
effectiveness in limiting suffering during armed conflicts. This
suggests that although its value is doubtful in low intensity conflicts,
in high intensity conflicts, which can also take the form of
transnational armed conflicts, great care should be taken before
deciding to prefer IHRL over IHL. IHRL might impose more legal
restrictions than IHL, but without the pragmatic compromise of IHL,
and in the absence of clear endorsement by states of the application of
IHRL, its practical significance is not clear.

